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A Strombolian explosion at dusk, Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu. This long exposure image 
highlights the rapid rise of incandescent bombs along ballistic trajectories, posing a risk to 









Direct impact from volcanic ballistic projectiles, fragments of solid rock or molten lava, are one 
of the most common causes of fatalities and injuries on volcanoes and have caused substantial 
damage and destruction of property and infrastructure. Despite this, ballistic hazard, impact and 
risk research trails behind other volcanic hazards. There is a good understanding of how 
ballistics are transported, how far they travel and their size, though little is understood of how 
they are distributed within a ballistic field, the intensity of ballistic hazard within the field, and 
how the spatial distribution changes over time. Consequently, when ballistic hazard has been 
included in hazard and risk assessments and management decisions, it is managed by placing a 
precautionary zone around the volcano, often based on the maximum travel distance.  
 
In addition, it is well known that an impact by a ballistic can cause injury or death, yet this is 
not the only aspect of the hazard footprint from an individual ballistic. Other aspects such as 
impact ejecta (surface debris and/or shrapnel from the ballistic) also contribute to the hazard 
footprint size and little is known about their ability to cause death or injury and how this changes 
over the hazard footprint. It is critical for hazard and risk managers to know the potential size 
of the hazard footprint that a person could be affected by and the hazard intensity that may be 
experienced to calculate risk effectively. Previously only direct impact and impact angle have 
been considered in risk calculations. This thesis aims to improve our understanding of ballistic 
hazard so that a more risk-based approach to hazard and risk assessment and management can 
be applied. This is achieved through review of ballistic hazard characteristics, hazard and risk 
assessments, maps, management and communication literature to get an overview of the topic 
and determine knowledge gaps; and field and experimental work to investigate the ballistic 
hazard footprint and hazard intensity. 
 
To assess how ballistic distribution and intensity change over a ballistic field, the ballistic 
hazard footprint at Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu was mapped from drone-captured orthophotos 
taken in two field campaigns two months apart. Mapping revealed that the spatial density of 
ballistics changed over small areas. Spatial density and ballistic size decreased with distance 
from the crater, while an increased spatial density was also noted to the S – SSE of the vent 






three-day period, it was found that explosion directionality slightly differed between the two 
data sets (mapping and video analysis) taken over different timescales suggesting that 
directionality may evolve over time.  
 
The size of the hazard footprint from an individual ballistic was found to be influenced by 
impact energy of the ballistic, ballistic diameter, crater diameter, ejecta travel distance, ejecta 
impact energy, ballistic density, substrate hardness, impact angle and slope. Pneumatic cannon 
experiments were used to investigate the contribution of impact ejecta to the hazard footprint. 
The kinetic energy and travel distance of impact ejecta produced from varying ballistic densities 
impacting different surfaces were analysed and findings showed that ejecta have the potential 
to cause injury or fatality on impact (based on hazard intensity values found in the literature). 
However, this was greatly dependent on the density of the impacting ballistic, the surface 
hardness, ballistic impact energy and where along the ejecta trajectory it impacted. Initial 
kinetic energy values were not retained over the entire ejecta trajectory, indicating that hazard 
intensity varies over the individual ballistic hazard footprint. 
 
To make the most effective risk management decisions it is important to understand both the 
hazard footprint and the hazard intensity. Ballistic hazard and risk assessments should be 
conducted over as much of the volcano as possible and assess the spatial density (hazard 
intensity) as well as the extent. Additionally, assessments should include all temporal hazard 
changes that may occur in the timeframe relevant to the assessment to get the greatest 
understanding of the spatial and temporal aspects of the hazard. When calculating hazard 
intensity, vulnerability and risk to people from ballistics on volcanoes, the kinetic energy of the 
impact ejecta should be included in the hazard footprint in addition to ballistic energy and 
impact angle. Improving current understanding of how ballistics are distributed in space and 
time, and how hazard intensity varies over the ballistic hazard footprint will vastly improve our 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
Volcanic eruptions produce multiple geological phenomena such as ash, pyroclastic density 
currents, and ballistics. These phenomena can be considered hazards, where they may 
negatively affect societal elements, such as people and infrastructure which may be susceptible 
to damage or loss (UNDRR 2017). Worldwide, over 29 million people live within 10 km of an 
active volcano (Brown et al. 2015). Active volcanoes also attract scientists, tourists and 
climbers. An increasing global population and an increasing number of visitors to active 
volcanoes means the number of people exposed to volcanic hazards will likely continue to rise 
(Erfurt-Cooper, Sigurdsson and Lopes 2015).  
1.1. Disaster risk reduction 
To combat negative consequences to society and the environment from volcanic hazards and a 
global need to reduce disaster consequences, disaster risk reduction (DRR) is used as the global 
unifying framework. DRR is the reduction of disaster risk through methodical analysis and 
management of the factors that cause disasters (UNDRR 2017).  
 
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) has outlined how disaster 
risk and the subsequent consequences can be reduced in the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015). Priority 1: Understanding Disaster Risk states that “Policies 
and practices for disaster risk management should be based on an understanding of disaster risk 
in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard 
characteristics and the environment” and encourages “the use of and strengthening of baselines 
and periodically assess disaster risks, vulnerability, capacity, exposure, hazard characteristics 
and their possible sequential effects at the relevant social and spatial scale on ecosystems, in 
line with national circumstances” (UNISDR 2015 pg. 9). 
 
Chapter One – Introduction 
 
Page | 2  
 
1.2. Disaster risk assessment 
A core principle of DRR is to take a scientific approach to understanding the disaster risk 
(UNISDR 2015). DRR strategies should be based on science and this approach should be 
systematic, repeatable and transparent. Disaster risk is the potential of death, injury, damage, 
and/or loss over a specified period of time from a hazardous event (UNDRR 2017). It is the 
product of the hazard (process or phenomenon that can cause negative consequences such as 
damage or death) interacting with assets exposed to the hazard (exposure), such as infrastructure 
and people, and the vulnerability or susceptibility of the exposed assets to damage by the hazard 
(UNDRR 2017).  
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 × 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
A volcanic risk assessment determines the probability of the adverse consequences occurring 
to exposed assets from hazardous events (Blong 1996). This typically includes: assessing the 
hazard by 1) reviewing the eruptive history of the volcano to ascertain eruptive frequency and 
magnitude, 2) field mapping, remote sensing and/or literature review to determine the nature 
and extent of the hazard, and 3) modelling of the hazard to explore future hazard extent (Sparks 
et al. 2013); assessing exposure by identifying which assets are exposed; and assessing 
vulnerability through vulnerability models informed from post-eruption impact assessments, 
empirical experiments, theoretical modelling and expert judgement (Rossetto and Elnashai 
2003; Wilson et al. 2017). Figure 1.1 conceptualises the risk assessment framework. Hazard 
informs vulnerability through hazard intensity metrics (HIMs) which are a measure of a hazard 
property linked to adverse consequences (Wilson et al. 2014). For example, an HIM that may 
be used to assess building vulnerability to ashfall is tephra thickness. A greater thickness 
(hazard property) of ash would likely result in damage (adverse consequence) to the building 
(Wilson et al. 2017). Exposure is linked to vulnerability by the relevant attributes of the exposed 
element. For example, when considering buildings, the attributes might be the type and strength 
of roofing or cladding of the exposed building. One way to express the potential consequence 
or risk is by using the concept of ‘Damage or Impact States’. They describe the scale of impact 
(e.g. damage) in terms of severity (Blong 2003). While Damage or Impact States are typically 
described in qualitative terms, they can also include or be related to a quantitative measure of 
risk e.g. percentage of damage or replacement cost (Blong 2003; Wilson et al. 2017). Risk 
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assessments can be both deterministic (scenario) or probabilistic, with pros and cons to both 
approaches (Marzocchi et al. 2004). Risk-to-life assessments, which are most relevant to 
ballistic risk assessments, are typically probabilistic so as to most effectively account for 
scientific and modelling uncertainties (Sparks et al. 2013). Once risk has been assessed, disaster 




Figure 1.1 Risk assessment framework where hazard and exposure are related by vulnerability to assess 
impact or risk (if there is an associated probability). 
 
1.3. Volcanic ballistic hazard and risk 
One volcanic hazard that has received less research attention than others, despite being the most 
common cause of volcano fatalities for tourists and scientists (Brown et al. 2017), is volcanic 
ballistic projectiles. Ballistics are fragments of molten lava or solid rock ejected in explosive 
eruptions. Diameters can range from a few centimetres to tens of metres (Nairn and Self 1978; 
Bower and Woods 1996; Swanson et al. 2012). They travel on ballistic trajectories, separating 
early from the eruptive column. Projectiles typically land within the first 5 km from the vent, 
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however they have been recorded up to ~10 km away (Blong 1984; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et 
al. 2012). Initial velocities can also range up to hundreds of metres per second (Harris et al. 
2012; Maeno et al. 2013). They therefore present a substantial risk to both life and 
infrastructure.  
 
Records show that ballistics have killed at least 367 people and injured hundreds more (Brown 
et al. 2017). A relatively unheralded eruption in 2014 from Mt Ontake, Japan, ejected ballistics 
which killed 55 people who were hiking around the summit (Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Injuries 
can be due to the kinetic energy on impact or from the thermal energy from molten bombs 
(Baxter and Gresham 1997). In addition to human impacts, ballistics have also caused loss and 
damage to buildings (Blong 1984; Williams et al. 2017), cars (Wardman et al. 2012), radio 
antenna (Wardman et al. 2012), aircraft (Blong 1984) and vegetation (Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia 
et al. 2012).  
 
Traditionally a precautionary approach to ballistic risk management has been taken where 
zonation was used to avoid the hazard (i.e. restriction or exclusion zones, as seen at Sakurajima 
Volcano (Kagoshima City 2010) and Yasur Volcano (Vanuatu Meteorology and Geo-hazards 
Department 2019)). This zone was often based on the hazard footprint (the spatial extent of the 
area affected by the hazard). Hazard footprints reported in literature include the maximum travel 
distance of a ballistic (Robertson et al. 1998; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012), mapped edges 
of ballistic fields (Minakami 1942), and distribution of ballistic size (Houghton et al. 2011). 
Rarely do they contain details of the spatial distribution within these areas such as spatial 
density of impacts (Fitzgerald et al. 2014). While a ballistic may travel 3 km, there may only 
be one ballistic landing at this distance over a 1 km2 area, thus the risk of being hit is extremely 
low. Further review of ballistic hazard and risk management and communication is provided in 
Chapter 2. 
 
With an increased need for DRR (due to population growth, land use, tourism, and legislature) 
there is a need for a more risk-based approach to assessment and management. This means that 
not only hazard, but exposure and vulnerability need to be incorporated into ballistic DRR and 
for those aspects to feed in and interact with each other. Human exposure to ballistic hazard is 
difficult to assess in detail due to the lack of knowledge on human behaviour on a volcano, 
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especially our movement during non-eruption and rapid onset eruption situations. There is also 
uncertainty surrounding the areas of the body that would be exposed to ballistic impact. 
Additionally, to assess human vulnerability properly would require medical knowledge of the 
human body and its susceptibility to injury, which is beyond the scope of this geology PhD. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on improving our understanding and assessment of ballistic 
hazard, both spatial and temporal, and how hazard interacts with exposure and vulnerability. 
 
While it is well known how far ballistics can travel (Minakami 1942; Blong 1984; Kilgour et 
al. 2010; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Gurioli et al. 2013), little is known about how 
they are distributed within the ballistic field (Fitzgerald et al. 2017). Spatial density is an 
important hazard intensity metric to use for considering the hazard of a ballistic field. Are there 
areas that may receive less ballistics than others and can therefore be deemed safer? And is this 
constant or does the spatial density change over time? Only a few ballistic fields have been 
mapped in detail and/or spatial density considered (Swanson et al. 2012; Gurioli et al. 2013; 
Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Kaneko et al. 2016). Three of these fields are from phreatic and 
phreatomagmatic events and one from a strombolian eruption. A larger dataset is needed to 
understand the spatial distribution and how this changes with distance and direction in a ballistic 
field and over time.  
 
Additionally, it is assumed that the hazard footprint of an individual ballistic impact consists 
only of the ballistic (i.e. a direct strike to the person). However, ballistics have been observed 
to produce impact craters (Maeno et al. 2013; Breard et al. 2014), roll and bounce out of impact 
craters (Bernard 2018; Taddeucci et al. 2017), produce ejecta (Waitt et al. 1995; Rosi et al. 
2006) and impact at an angle (Minakami 1942; Maeno et al. 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014). These 
factors can create their own hazard and/or change the size of the footprint. Can the size of the 
hazard footprint be quantified? How hazardous are these factors? Records show deaths and 
injuries from impacts with ballistics (Baxter and Gresham 1997; Brown et al. 2017) but can 
these factors also cause these outcomes? Does the level of hazard intensity (in this case kinetic 
energy) change over the footprint? By understanding the size of the hazard footprint, the hazard 
intensity exposure (the area that people are exposed to) and vulnerability (the level of hazard 
intensity that may cause susceptibility to an asset) can then be assessed. Many of these questions 
have led to the overall aim and specific objectives of this thesis. 
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1.4. Thesis aims and objectives 
The overarching aim of this research is to improve our understanding of volcanic ballistic 
hazard so that it can be better assessed and managed. Currently there is limited understanding 
of the distribution of ballistics within a ballistic field, the hazard intensity within the field, and 
how the spatial distribution changes with time. Furthermore, little research has been completed 
on the hazard footprint of an individual ballistic, what factors influence it and how hazard 
intensity varies within it. These knowledge gaps affect the way ballistic hazard is managed.  To 
achieve this overall aim, six objectives will be addressed (Figure 1.2): 
 
1) A review of ballistic hazard and risk characteristics, management and communication 
to provide an overview of the topic and recommendations for how management and 
communication could be improved. 
2) Determine the size and spatial distribution of ballistics from a complex, cumulative 
ballistic field through detailed mapping, to understand the spatial and temporal 
distribution of hazard intensity across the hazard footprint. 
3) Using an integrative approach, assess temporal ballistic hazard and how this is affected 
by eruption dynamics. 
4) Review and understand the factors that contribute to the hazard footprint from an 
individual ballistic impact.  
5) Quantify the size and hazard intensity of the hazard footprint from an individual ballistic 
from impact ejecta associated with ballistics of different density and different substrates 
to improve ballistic hazard and risk assessments. 
 
It is important to note that this thesis has been completed as a geology (not a disaster risk 
reduction) PhD thesis. As such it focusses on the geological phenomena which influence 
hazard. The above review of risk assessment and management is used to acknowledge and place 
this research in the wider disaster risk reduction context.  
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Figure 1.2 Conceptual diagram of thesis objectives 
 
1.5. Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured into six chapters, three of which are stand-alone papers with their own 
introductions. Chapter 1 provides a broad introduction to the disaster risk reduction framework, 
research objectives and thesis structure. Chapter 2 reviews the various processes and products 
used to manage and communicate ballistic hazard and risk and provides a detailed overview of 
ballistic hazard and risk assessments (Objective 1). It was published as a chapter in Observing 
the Volcano World: Volcano Crisis Communication, part of the IAVCEI series Advances in 
Volcanology. Chapter 3 uses Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu as a case study to understand ballistic 
distribution from a frequently erupting volcano (Objective 2). It examines how eruption 
dynamics influence the spatial distribution and how this changes over time (Objective 3). This 
chapter was submitted to the journal Volcanica and has been accepted pending minor revisions. 
Chapter 4 reviews the various factors that influence the size of the hazard footprint from an 
individual ballistic impact (Objective 4), presents results from pneumatic cannon testing to 
analyse hazard intensity (kinetic energy) of ejecta produced from a ballistic impact with varying 
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surfaces, and introduces damage states and hazard intensity metrics for ballistics (Objective 5). 
It will be submitted to the Journal of Applied Volcanology. The thesis is then summarised, and 
conclusions drawn in Chapter 5. The content of these chapters is my own work; however, my 
co-authors did provide data, editing, analysis, guidance, and useful discussions. Their 
contributions are listed in the preceding co-authorship forms. 
 
The appendices contain further lead and co-authored work on ballistic hazard and risk that were 
undertaken during this PhD, although though not within the scope of this thesis: 
- Appendix A is a co-authored paper that describes the acoustic radiation pattern from 
explosions at Yasur Volcano recorded using a tethered aerostat. The video footage of 
ballistic explosions used to analyse explosion directionality in Chapter 3 was 
additionally used in this paper to confirm directionality observed in the acoustic data.  
- Appendix B is a lead-author EQC funding report detailing the ballistic hazard and 
impact assessment trip to Japan in 2015. The ballistic distributions and damage to 
buildings from the 2000 eruption of Usu Volcano and the 2014 eruption of Mt. Ontake 
were investigated. See Appendix D for the published article on the building damage. 
- Appendix C contains a co-authored published report outlining eruption scenarios 
created for the Auckland Volcanic Field with the expectation that they will be used in 
impact and risk studies. Each scenario included modelling of the ballistic hazard.  
- Appendix D is a co-authored paper published in the Journal of Volcanology and 
Geothermal Research on the vulnerability of buildings to ballistic impact. It combines 
field measurements (see Appendix B), data reported in literature, and experimental 
results to develop fragility functions for various building typologies.  
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Preamble (Chapter 2) 
In Chapter 1 I summarised what disaster risk reduction is, the importance of understanding 
ballistic hazard and how it has been approached using disaster risk reduction measures, and the 
knowledge gaps that led to the research objectives being addressed in this thesis. This chapter 
reviews the current research on ballistic distributions, consequences, hazard and risk 
assessments, hazard maps, and processes and products used to communicate and manage 
ballistic risk. Recommended strategies for communicating and managing ballistic hazard are 
also provided.  
 
Chapter 2 has been published in the book Observing the Volcano World: Volcano Crisis 
Communication: Fitzgerald RH, Kennedy BM, Wilson TM, Leonard GS, Tsunematsu K and 
Keys H (2017). The communication and risk management of volcanic ballistic hazards. In: 
Fearnley C, Bird D, Jolly G, Haynes K and McGuire B (Eds) Observing the Volcano World: 




Conceptual diagram showing the objectives of the thesis with the objective addressed in 
Chapter 2 in red.
 
Chapter Two – The communication and risk management of volcanic ballistic hazards 
 
Page | 14  
 
Chapter Two – The communication and risk management 
of volcanic ballistic hazards 
2.1. Abstract 
Tourists, hikers, mountaineers, locals and volcanologists frequently visit and reside on and 
around active volcanoes, where ballistic projectiles are a lethal hazard. The projectiles of molten 
lava or solid rock, ranging from a few centimetres to several metres in diameter, are erupted 
with high kinetic, and sometimes thermal, energy. Impacts from projectiles are amongst the 
most frequent causes of fatal volcanic incidents and the cause of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of damage to buildings, infrastructure and property worldwide. Despite this, the 
assessment of risk and communication of ballistic hazard has received surprisingly little study. 
Here, we review the research to date on ballistic distributions, impact consequences, hazard and 
risk assessments and maps, and methods of communicating and managing ballistic risk 
including how these change with a changing risk environment. The review suggests future 
improvements to the communication and management of ballistic hazard.  
2.2. Introduction 
Ballistic projectiles are one potentially lethal and damaging hazard produced in volcanic 
eruptions. Ballistics are fragments of molten lava (bombs) or solid rock (blocks) ejected in 
explosive eruptions (Figure 2.1a and b). Projectiles range from a few centimetres to tens of 
metres in diameter and separate from the eruptive column to follow nearly parabolic trajectories 
(Wilson 1972; Fagents and Wilson 1993; Bower and Woods 1996). Their exit velocities can 
reach hundreds of metres per second and land up to ~10 km from the vent, although typically 
within five kilometres (Blong 1984; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012). Ballistics are 
associated with all forms of explosive eruptions but are considered major hazards of 
hydrothermal, phreatic, phreatomagmatic, Strombolian and Vulcanian eruptions, especially 
those which have little to no precursory signals of volcanic unrest. Managing ballistic hazard 
and risk on active volcanoes, particularly those permanently occupied or regularly visited, 
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presents considerable challenges: it requires good information and specialist communication 
strategies around risk mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery dependent on the state 
of the volcano, e.g. pre-, during- and post-eruption. In this chapter, we present an overview of 
volcanic ballistic hazards and consequences and the communication strategies used to manage 
risk on active volcanoes. 
 
Figure 2.1: Types of ballistic particles and their consequences: a. Ballistic bombs from Yasur Volcano, 
Vanuatu (photo credit: Ben Kennedy), b. Ballistic blocks (1.4 m diameter block) from the August 2012 
Upper Te Maari eruption, c. Damage to a building from ballistics ejected in the 2000 Mt. Usu, Japan 
eruption, d. Damage to the environment illustrated by a 4.4 m wide crater from the August 2012 Upper Te 
Maari, Tongariro eruption, e. Damage to a hiking hut from 2012 Upper Te Maari ballistics (photo credit: 
Nick Kennedy) 
2.3. Ballistic hazard and risk management 
Ballistic projectiles are a risk to life on active volcanoes and can cause substantial damage to 
exposed infrastructure and the environment due to their high kinetic energy, mass, and often 
high temperatures (Blong 1984). Volcanic ballistic projectiles are amongst the most frequent 
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causes of fatal incidents on volcanoes, with at least 76 recorded deaths at six volcanoes 
(Galeras, Yasur, Popocatepetl, Pacaya, Raoul Island and Ontake) since 1993 (Baxter and 
Gresham 1997; Cole et al. 2006; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Wardman et al. 2012; 
Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Many more people have been injured as a result of ballistic impacts, 
frequently suffering from blunt force trauma (broken bones), lacerations, burns, abrasions and 
bruising (Blong 1984; Baxter and Gresham 1997). Additionally, damage to buildings (Figure 
2.1c and e), infrastructure, property and the surrounding environment (Figure 2.1d) are also 
common occurrences from ballistics during explosive eruptions. The high kinetic and thermal 
energy of ballistics can puncture, dent, melt, burn and knock down structures and their 
associated systems, such as power supply and telecommunication masts; crater roads; and crush 
and ignite vegetation (Booth 1979; Calvari et al. 2006; Pistolesi et al. 2008 Alatorre-
Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Wardman et al. 2012; Andronico et al. 2013; Maeno et al. 2013; 
Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Jenkins et al. 2014). Blong (1981), Pomonis et al. (1999) and Jenkins et 
al. (2014) estimate a ballistic only needs 400-1000 J of kinetic energy to penetrate a metal sheet 
roof, far less than the estimated kinetic energy of ballistics (~106 J) from VEI 2-4 eruptions 
(Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012). 
 
The distribution (distance from vent, direction, area and density) of ejected ballistics is 
controlled by the explosivity, type, size and direction of explosive eruptions, and usually creates 
spatially variable deposits (Gurioli et al. 2013; Breard et al. 2014; Fitzgerald et al. 2014). 
Generally, the distance travelled, and the total area impacted by ballistics increases with 
increasing explosivity, i.e. particles generally travel further and cover a greater area in 
Vulcanian eruptions (Nairn and Self 1978; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Maeno et al. 
2013) compared with Strombolian eruptions (Harris et al. 2012; Gurioli et al. 2013; Turtle et 
al. 2016). However, eruptions can be directed, ejecting ballistics at low angles and at distances 
greater than those from more vertically directed eruptions (Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Tsunematsu 
et al. 2016). The directionality of these blasts is often unpredictable and can be influenced by 
external factors such as landslides (Christiansen 1980; Breard et al. 2014), making it difficult 
to deterministically forecast future ballistic distributions. Mapped deposits from past eruptions 
are often not symmetrical around the vent, reflecting this directionality (Minakami 1942; Fudali 
and Melson 1972; Steinberg and Lorenz 1983; Kilgour et al. 2010; Houghton et al. 2011; 
Gurioli et al. 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014),  and are sometimes the result of the crater and 
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surrounding topography (Breard et al. 2014; Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Detailed descriptions and 
maps of ballistic impact distributions are rare, but those published may contain some of the 
following data: maximum ballistic travel distances (Steinberg and Lorenz 1983; Robertson et 
al. 1998; Kaneko et al. 2016); the outer edges of a ballistic field (Minakami 1942; Nairn and 
Self 1978; Yamagishi and Feebrey 1994); and/or maximum particle (Nairn and Self 1978; 
Steinberg and Lorenz 1983; Robertson et al. 1998; Swanson et al. 2012) or crater size 
(Robertson et al. 1998; Maeno et al. 2013; Kaneko et al. 2016). When isopleths of particle size 
are included these rarely contain individual measurements and may be severely limited by the 
availability of only specific mapped locations (e.g., Kilgour et al. 2010; Houghton et al. 2011). 
For this reason, the number of particles, sizes of particles, and spatial density per unit area is 
rarely reported (only four publications could be found with this level of detail - Pistolesi et al. 
2008; Swanson et al. 2012; Gurioli et al. 2013; Kaneko et al. 2016). This leads to a limited 
understanding of the hazard and risk posed to the area.  
 
Though work has been completed on ballistic hazard (e.g., mapping deposits, better 
understanding eruption dynamics and the factors that influence ballistic distribution, recording 
particle velocities, the creation and use of ballistic trajectory models, and the production of 
hazard maps either focussed solely on ballistics or as an aspect of a multi-hazard map), very 
little has been focussed on the management of ballistic risk, leaving a large knowledge gap and 
a need for research in this area. Risk management strategies and mitigation systems are key to 
protecting life and infrastructure from ballistic hazards (Leonard et al. 2008; Bertolaso et al. 
2009; Bird et al. 2010; Jolly et al. 2014b). Table 2.1 lists some of the strategies and tools used 
at volcanoes around the world. 
 
Table 2.1: Risk management and communication strategies with selected example volcanoes where they 















Hazard assessments determine the 
likelihoods of hazard producing events 
and the areas that may be impacted. 
These can be expanded to risk 
assessments to determine the likelihood 





Mount Fuji Disaster 
Prevention Council 2004; 
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 
2012; Jolly et al. 2014b; 
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 
2016 
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societal assets. They underpin and 
inform other risk management strategies 
Hazard and 
risk maps 
Identify zones of relative hazard and/or 






Mount Fuji Disaster 
Prevention Council 2004; 





Systems deployed on and around a 
volcano to monitor volcanic activity and 
indicate when the volcano is in unrest or 
eruption. Research is also conducted on 
the eruptive behaviour (e.g. magnitude 















To monitor and detect a hazardous event 
(e.g. eruption) and communicate a 
warning to those potentially exposed. 






Formal communications from a volcano 
observatory which communicate changes 
in volcano behaviour, notify emergency 
managers and the population of an 









Plan for directing response actions which 
aim to reduce the consequences of an 
eruption. Plans are best executed with 
training and exercises in their use 
Ruapehu 
Sakurajima 




Rescue services Deploy in emergencies to provide aid to 
affected persons and properties, e.g. 
Search and Rescue, police, ambulance, 
and fire services 
Ontake 
Ruapehu 
Kilgour et al. 2010; The 
Japan Times 27/9/15 
Land use 
planning 
Policy and regulations used to minimise 
or exclude the development of settlement 
and construction of high-value assets in 









Structures designed to withstand specific 










Area restrictions commonly used 
temporarily during eruptions or unrest. 
Permanent zones may be required when 
risk is sufficiently high or frequent 
Sakurajima 
Stromboli 
Bertolaso et al. 2009; 
Kagoshima City 2010 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
Involvement of stakeholders (e.g. people 
and organisations potentially affected by 
an eruption) in planning and activities to 
manage the risk. This is essential for 
effective hazard and risk communication, 
and to establish appropriate and 




Williams and Keys 2013; 







Education resources which aid 
communication of hazard and risk 
information, often developed specifically 
for non-expert stakeholders.  These can 
include pamphlets and brochures, 
websites, warning signs, videos, and 
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Effective communication of ballistic hazard and risk to end-users such as the public, 
stakeholders in the area and emergency managers underpins effective development and 
implementation of these risk management strategies. However, ballistic hazard and risk are not 
and should not be treated the same at all volcanoes. The risk environment (the hazard, the 
number of people and assets exposed and their associated vulnerability) will determine the 
strategies, tools and methods of communication, and their relative importance, utilised in the 
overall risk management strategy. The volcano tourism industry is also growing (Sigurdsson 
and Lopes-Gautier 1999, Erfurt-Cooper 2011), increasing the number of people exposed to 
ballistic hazard in proximal areas. In addition, population growth in many volcanic regions 
means increasing numbers of people are settling closer to and on volcanoes (Small and 
Naumann 2001; Ewart and Harpel 2004). This creates an increasing demand for ballistic hazard 
and risk assessments coupled with effective communication strategies to manage ballistic risk 
at volcanoes. Ballistics are not a hazard in isolation. Their management needs to be integrated 
with that of other volcanic hazards (especially pyroclastic density currents in terms of near-vent 
life safety, but also landslides, lahars, lava flows, and volcanic gas emissions/areas of hot 
ground), and other life safety issues such as severe weather and mountain safety. 
 
2.4. Assessments of ballistic hazard and risk 
Successful management of the risk from ballistic hazards typically requires first assessing the 
level of risk.  This may range from the simple recognition that ballistics may endanger people 
or their activities on a volcano to a sophisticated quantitative hazard or risk assessment (e.g. 
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Jolly et al. 2014b). Ballistic hazard assessments determine 
the likelihood of ballistic-producing eruptions and the areas that may be affected (Thouret et al. 
2000; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012). Risk assessments estimate the likelihood of 
consequences (i.e. death, injury, damage) from exposure to ballistics, typically with an 
associated probability of occurrence (Blong 1996). Once the level of risk has been assessed it 
can be used as the robust basis for risk management strategies, such as exclusion zones, 
hazard/risk maps and signs, and land-use planning. Ideal assessments involve a number of steps 
including: (1) a review of the eruption history of the volcano to determine past eruption 
frequencies and magnitudes, thus informing future eruption probabilities; (2) field mapping, 
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remote sensing and/or review of past reports and literature to determine the nature and extent 
of past ballistic distributions;  (3) utilising ballistic trajectory models to explore possible future 
distributions and areas of hazard; (4) identifying exposed assets in the area such as humans 
(visitors and inhabitants) and infrastructure; and (5) estimating their vulnerability to the hazard 
i.e. likelihood of fatality or damage (Nadim 2013). Assessments are ideally probabilistic, 
providing spatially varying probabilities of occurrence and damage from a range of scenarios 
varying in frequency and magnitude, and accounting for model and input parameter uncertainty. 
They should be constantly refined and improved as new information becomes available.  
 
A hazard map is a primary tool used to present hazard and risk information (Sparks et al. 2013). 
Zonation is generally used as a means to distinguish areas of hazard, exposure, vulnerability 
and risk (Sparks et al. 2013). Ballistic hazard map zones may be classified by maximum travel 
distance of particles (either any size or a specific sized particle; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 
2012), number of ballistic impacts per unit area (Gurioli et al. 2013), probability of a specific 
size of ballistics reaching a given area (Artunduaga and Jimenez 1997), or probability of a 
specific consequence occurring e.g. death, injury, damage (Fitzgerald et al. 2014). A good 
example of a ballistic hazard map that follows the best-practice steps above was created by 
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. (2012) of Popocatepetl Volcano, Mexico. In this example, 
eruption history and frequency of occurrence are used to define three eruption scenarios (High: 
VEI 2 – 3 (as they are more frequent), Intermediate: 4, and Low: 5 (though an eruption of this 
size would affect more people and impact a larger area, it has a much lower likelihood of 
occurring). The maximum travel distance of ballistic projectiles from each scenario (based on 
field and model distributions) is then used to define the extent of the hazard zones. Additionally, 
the map identifies nearby towns and roads exposed to ballistic hazard.  
 
In many instances, it may not be possible or warranted to complete all of the steps involved in 
an ideal risk assessment. For example, Gareloi Volcano, Alaska is located on an uninhabited 
island, thus a detailed ballistic hazard assessment was not the priority of initial hazard 
assessments. Coombs et al. (2008) explore the eruptive history of Gareloi Volcano, though 
eruption frequency is only narrowed down to one eruption every 20 – 50 years and is not broken 
down into eruption magnitudes. Ballistic hazard is confined to one hazard zone (a 5 km 
concentric radius around the vent), whose extent is based on Blong’s (1996) assessment that 
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ballistics generally do not travel further than 5 km from vent. It is also mentioned that recent 
ballistic distributions have not travelled further than several hundred metres from vent. Neither 
a deterministic or probabilistic approach was taken, instead a value was adopted from other 
eruptions around the world.  
 
Very few studies exist on ballistic risk or vulnerability. We summarise the three that could be 
found. Booth (1979) presents an example of a volcanic risk map for the La Primavera Volcanic 
Complex, Mexico. Though ballistics are included, they are not ascribed a probability of 
occurrence, instead, one zone at risk of ballistic fall is defined by the maximum travel distance 
for ballistics up to 0.1 m in diameter. The equation that Booth used to calculate risk includes 
probability of occurrence, indicating that eruption frequency has been examined; however, 
neither the probability used nor the description of prior eruptive history are provided in the 
publication. Thus, though an end-product of a risk map is produced, the process itself is not 
documented. Pomonis et al. (1999) utilise the Blong (1981) impact energy thresholds for roof 
perforation to assess building vulnerability from an eruption of Furnas Volcano, the Azores. 
Two risk zones are assigned (moderate and high) based on the statement that ballistics generally 
land within 5 km of the vent, but sometimes up to 10 km. The study only considers one eruption 
(the last major eruption), thus is lacking eruption frequency and magnitude, and does not 
provide any probabilities of building damage occurring. Building vulnerability to ballistic 
impact has been assessed by Jenkins et al. (2014) for Kanlaon and Fogo volcanoes (Philippines 
and Cape Verde, respectively) using estimates of energy required to penetrate roof materials by 
Blong (1981) and Pomonis et al. (1999). This study, however, focussed only on the vulnerability 
of the built environment and did not include an overall assessment of hazard or risk. Eruption 
frequency and magnitude, the extent of past ballistic distributions, and modelling of possible 
future trajectories were not investigated.  
 
Assessments may also vary depending on the state of the volcano. Volcanoes in a state of 
quiescence allow for (and call for) more in-depth, preferably probabilistic, assessment to be 
completed, ideally following the steps outlined earlier. However, quiescent volcanoes may not 
be the primary target for in-depth assessment. Conversely, renewed volcanic activity, especially 
when unexpected, urgently demands rapid hazard assessments which may, as a result, be too 
simplistic, overly conservative or lacking sufficient detail to be considered complete. They also 
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need to be focussed on the range of scenarios presenting the risk in that crisis (e.g. from one 
vent), rather than the entire background risk from that volcano (e.g. from multiple vents). 
Leonard et al. (2014) describe the process of creating a crisis hazard map for the 2012 Upper 
Te Maari eruption, comparing this to the existing background hazard map. In the case of a 
volcano in a state of unrest, assessments may be limited by the availability of safe locations to 
survey, and this is especially likely once an eruption episode has commenced as evident during 
the 2012 Upper Te Maari, Tongariro eruptions and assessments presented later. Odbert et al. 
(2015) have been developing updateable hazard forecast estimates using Bayesian belief 
networks, which may help to improve rapid hazard assessments in times of crisis. 
 
2.5. Communication and risk management strategies 
Effective communication is essential in managing ballistic hazard and risk (Barclay et al. 2008; 
Leonard et al. 2014). Science needs to be communicated to decision-makers, stakeholders, and 
the public and understood and absorbed by them so they can make informed decisions. 
Similarly, the public, stakeholders, and decision-makers should communicate to scientists what 
type of information they need to make decisions relevant to their situations. Methods used to 
communicate ballistic hazard and risk at volcanoes include hazard and risk assessments, hazard 
maps, volcano monitoring and research, real-time warning systems, volcanic alert levels; 
volcano warnings, alert bulletins and communication with agencies; response exercises, 
education materials, response plans, exclusion and evacuation zones, instructions and signage 
for what to do in the event of an eruption around the volcano, community engagement, 
educational materials, and land-use planning and infrastructure design. These methods typically 
fall under four aspects of emergency management: Mitigation (Reduction), Preparedness, 
Response and Recovery (UNISDR 2009). Methods must also be integrated with the 
management of other risks, ideally in one cohesive approach. Ballistic communication 
strategies will also vary with eruption frequency, the risk context (quiescence or crisis; Figure 
2.2), whether volcanoes are frequently visited or inhabited, and the availability of resources. 
This equally applies to volcanoes at which ballistics are/are not the main hazard. 
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Figure 2.2: Various ballistic hazard and risk communication processes (blue) and products (red) 
implemented over the changing state of the volcano and the stage of risk or emergency management. The 
level of activity/importance is indicated by line style, with solid lines indicating higher use or importance 
 
Effective risk management is built on communication, hazard education and engagement with 
the at-risk communities (Johnston et al. 1999; Johnston et al. 2000; Paton et al. 2001; Twigg 
2002; Gregg et al. 2004; Leonard et al. 2008; Dohaney et al. 2015). Appropriate risk 
management actions by stakeholders, emergency managers and the public require an adequate 
perception of the risk and the correct actions to take in a crisis, with perception dependent on 
the hazard information received and exposure to consequences (Johnston et al. 1999; Leonard 
et al. 2014). Knowledge and understanding of volcanic hazards allows individuals to better 
decide whether to undertake preparedness and response measures, and if so, which are required, 
thus reducing their vulnerability to the hazard(s) (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000; Paton et al. 
2008; Bird et al. 2010).  
 
Scientific information can be misunderstood, misrepresented or distorted when passed from 
scientists to end-users (stakeholders, emergency managers and the public; Barclay et al. 2008). 
This can occur when end-users do not comprehend or are unaware of the science being 
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presented, the information is not what is actually needed by end-users, the science is 
communicated poorly to end-users, or there is a lack of trust between groups (Haynes et al. 
2007). All groups therefore need to communicate with each other, preferably prior to a volcanic 
crisis, with communication products tailored to the audience (Haynes et al. 2007; Leonard et 
al. 2008). Following the 1979 eruption of Mt. Ontake, Japan the National Research Institute for 
Earth Science and Disaster Prevention in Japan (NIED, though now renamed to National 
Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience) completed a report 
recommending: regulations on development and land-use, building of ballistic shelters and 
evacuation facilities, and the development of emergency plans, as an eruption in the summer 
hiking season would likely result in human casualties (NIED 1980). However, the report may 
not have been suitable or communicated well to the local municipalities responsible for disaster 
management as these recommendations were not adopted prior to the 2014 eruption, indicating 
the need for communication to ensure the information is relevant, understood and acted upon 
(Barclay et al. 2008; The Japan News, 27/10/2014). Communication delivered jointly by 
scientists and the local community is also advisable as community members may be better 
trusted and better communicators to their community than scientists in isolation.  Users must 
be able to trust the source of the information being released as well as how and what is presented 
(Slovic 2000; Haynes et al. 2008). It is also therefore important for scientists and emergency 
managers to be honest about what is/is not known to maintain credibility and trust (Lindell 
2013). 
 
Best practice suggests the use of multiple sources to disseminate hazard and risk information 
as preferred forms of media accessed for information vary (Sorensen 2000; Mileti et al. 2004; 
Haynes et al. 2007; Bird et al. 2010). The public’s response to volcanic hazard communication 
is influenced by the content and attractiveness of the message (which should include a 
description of the hazard, its consequences, hazard extent, and advice on what to do and when), 
how comprehensible it is, and the frequency and number of channels the message is received 
from, as well as the extent of public belief that safety actions are possible and will be effective 
(Leonard et al. 2008; Sorensen 2013). 
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2.5.1. Ballistic communication processes and products in different risk 
contexts 
2.5.1.1. Volcano quiescence 
Communication and risk management methods vary with changing eruptive states. In times of 
quiescence focus is placed on risk mitigation and preparedness, with access generally allowed 
into the hazard zone. In terms of ballistics this includes the completion of ballistic hazard and 
risk assessments; volcano monitoring and research; land-use and building planning i.e. the 
building of ballistic shelters capable of withstanding ballistic impacts or the reinforcement of 
existing structures to specific building standards, and the choice of location for hiking trails, 
viewing platforms or other visitor facilities; the creation of well distributed hazard maps with 
instructional text with what to do or where to go in an event of an eruption; and engagement 
with the local communities including exercises and evaluation (Figure 2.2).  
 
Hazard and risk assessments are useful starting points for all communication and management 
strategies as the nature, extent and consequences of the hazard need to be understood prior to 
any decisions being made. The assessment should be made available to relevant decision 
makers, with the authors and science advisors available to advise or answer questions about the 
assessments. Scientists/authors should always strive to be transparent in their methodology. 
Transparency builds trust and credibility. It is important that stakeholders know the limitations 
of the information presented to them and/or informing decisions which affect them. It may not 
be needed or appropriate for the methods to be presented to the stakeholders in depth but instead 
it be communicated that they are available if requested. However, it is imperative to think of 
the risk context when making these decisions, as every situation is different. Methods and 
assessments should also be made fully available to other scientists so that these methods can be 
adopted at other volcanoes if chosen, which would increase best-practice and encourage similar 
and comparable methodologies. These assessments also need to be communicated to the public 
so that they can make informed decisions about the hazard and risk in the area they choose to 
enter as well as what steps they need to take to protect themselves.  
 
The main way assessments are communicated is through a map (Haynes et al. 2007). Ballistic 
hazard maps are rare as they are typically not the only hazard produced in an eruption. Instead 
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ballistics are typically included in ‘all-hazard’ or ‘multi-hazard’ maps (Figure 2.3) depicting 
the general hazard for all active vent(s) (Neal et al. 2001; Hadisantono et al. 2002; Mount Fuji 
Disaster Prevention Council 2004; Kagoshima City 2010; Leonard et al. 2014). Ballistics are 
usually represented by one hazard zone, often based on the maximum or expected travel 
distance of a ballistic clast. This is, in part, because the public require concise, easily 
comprehensible information, rather than being distracted or overloaded with specifics of 
individual hazards (Haynes et al. 2007; Leonard et al. 2014). An effective hazard map for the 
public contains clear information on what are the consequences of the hazard(s), where they 
occur, and what to do (Leonard et al. 2014). For ballistics, consequences may be death or injury; 
impact locations are usually within 5 km of the vent; and advice may include “if ballistics are 
landing around you, move out of their oncoming path, seek shelter and make yourself a small 
target.” Advice on actions to be taken may vary at different volcanoes. It would be beneficial 
for testing of suggested actions to occur to ensure that the safest and most successful measures 
are being advised. For example, where frequent Strombolian explosions are the main source of 
ballistics, it may be possible to watch the low velocity ballistics and move out of their path. 
However, in many other eruption styles multiple particles may be ejected rapidly toward a 
person, presenting a situation in which dodging one ballistic may put you in the path of another. 
It may be more beneficial to make yourself as small a target as possible, seek shelter and use 
your backpack as a protective shield. Additionally, ballistics may be accompanied by a surge 
as seen in the 2014 Mt Ontake (Kaneko et al. 2016; Oikawa et al. 2016) and August 2012 Te 
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Figure 2.3: Volcanic hazard maps of Tongariro volcano, New Zealand: a. General background hazard map 
used in quiescent periods (GNS Science 2007), focussed on hazards from events up to a scale that may not 
have significant precursors to enable warning; b. Event-specific crisis hazard map following the 2012 
eruptions of Upper Te Maari (GNS Science 2012). Note that map A is shown as an inset on map B with an 
explanation as to the complementary but differing nature of the two communication products 
 
Map design should also take into account the effect of map properties on communication 
(understanding/comprehension) such as data classification, basemap or image, colour 
scheme (e.g. for colour blind readers), content, and key expression (Haynes et al. 2007; 
Thompson et al. 2015). Haynes et al. (2007) evaluated the effectiveness of volcanic hazard 
maps as communication tools on Montserrat, West Indies and found that the use of aerial 
photographs as a basemap improved people’s ability to comprehend hazard information 
compared to traditional contour basemaps. In general, it has been found the public do not 
comprehend maps well and professional design input guided by iterative evaluation of map 
comprehension is wise (Haynes et al. 2007; Thompson et al. 2015). In contrast to the public, 
more specialist stakeholders such as infrastructure managers may require more detailed and 
hazard specific information about the consequences, location and recommended actions to 
inform decisions on land-use and building strength e.g. ballistic impacts in zone 1 can be 
expected to have sufficient energy to cause severe damage to nearly all types of infrastructure 
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below a certain design standard. Multiple zones of different impact intensity may be shown 
(e.g. travel distance, density of impacts in an area, size and or energy of expected ballistics in 
given scenarios). All end-user maps should successfully balance adequate detail and maximum 
clarity. Hazard maps and additional information should be made available and accessible to the 
public, and if different maps are made for, or directed to, different audiences their content must 
be consistent. Public availability may include being posted on signs around the volcanoes 
entrance(s), in a pamphlet or similar printed media at tourist facilities (e.g. information centres, 
tourism businesses, hotels, backpackers accommodation, transport operators), and on relevant 
websites such as volcano observatories and those charged with managing natural hazards.  
 
Additionally, community engagement and participation in meetings with scientists and 
managers is encouraged as a means of risk communication, and discussion around management 
strategies, especially for communities at risk (i.e. tourism providers and those living near or on 
the volcano) (Cronin et al. 2004; Williams and Keys 2013). Ballistic hazards lend themselves 
to this type of community engagement because many open system volcanoes that may be 
constantly erupting but not considered to be in a state of volcanic crisis (e.g. Stromboli, and 
Yasur) have frequent ballistic-producing explosions that provide an attraction to tourists and 
employment for the local community. Ballistics at these constantly erupting volcanoes provide 
tangible hazards that the community can both relate to and provide valuable observational data 
on. Meetings should be sufficiently regular to update residents when the status of a volcano is 
changing and to remind them when necessary of the hazards and risks. Briefing those new to 
the area, especially the transient visitor, may be the biggest challenge.  Engagement allows the 
community to be prepared in the event of an eruption and to know what to do in the event that 
they are within hazard areas. 
 
2.5.1.2. Volcanic crisis 
In a volcanic crisis (when the volcano is showing signs of unrest or is in eruption) 
communication and emergency management processes and products move toward response 
(Figure 2.2). Real-time warning systems triggered by monitoring equipment, such as the EDS 
(Eruption Detection System) system installed on Mt Ruapehu, New Zealand (Leonard et al. 
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2008), are used to communicate an eruption to those in the immediate vicinity. Wider 
communication occurs when an event is communicated from monitoring equipment to 
scientists, then onto emergency managers and decision-makers. Part of this process is the 
release of alert bulletins/warnings to advise the public of unrest, eruption phenomena, affected 
areas, and should always include instructions on what to do. Alert bulletins, existing hazard 
maps and risk and hazard assessments provide emergency managers with information to make 
decisions on limiting access to parts of the volcano. In the case of ballistics, limits or restrictions 
on access or development are usually achieved via creation of an exclusion zone, typically 1 – 
4 km in radius (Kagoshima City 2010; Jolly et al. 2014b), or by reducing exposure by limiting 
the time spent or number of individuals allowed within a zone (Bertolaso et al. 2009).  
 
During the crisis, hazard maps are typically updated, and hazard and risk assessments modified. 
Maps are generally event-specific and only used over a short time-frame, reverting back to the 
original background hazard maps once the crisis period is over (Leonard et al. 2014; Figure 
2.3). However, ballistic hazard mapping during a crisis can be limited by access restrictions due 
to the possibility of further eruptions, though as time progresses more detailed mapping is able 
to be completed (Fitzgerald et al. 2014). The ongoing work by Odbert et al. (2015) in 
developing a real-time updateable probabilistic risk assessment may prove useful in these 
situations. The event-specific hazard maps are generally shared around the various media 
outlets (e.g., television, radio, newspapers, Facebook, Twitter) to inform the public of the 
updated hazard, as well as through the usual means of communication. They may be augmented 
by specific life safety signage (e.g. Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Crisis communication sign temporarily used at Ruapehu volcano following a small eruption in 
2007, while it was considered there was an elevated risk of further eruptions 
 
 
Meetings and consultations with local communities, emergency managers and other 
stakeholders should also occur during and following volcanic crises. The objectives of such 
meetings are to update communities on the evolving eruptive hazards, build relationships and 
trust, reduce any miscommunication or misinformation passed along, and to make sure the 
information being presented is what the end-members need (Barclay et al. 2008; Bertolaso et 
al. 2009). 
 
Communication of ballistic hazards and risk management vary at frequently erupting volcanoes 
that commonly enter in and out of crisis, such as Sakurajima in Japan. Access is generally 
controlled at all times (even during periods of quiescence), sometimes with permanent 
restriction zones in which nobody is allowed to enter due to the risk of being struck by ballistics 
(Kagoshima City 2010). In these cases, different hazard scenarios may be pre-prepared and 
communication strategies reused with a population that is well educated about the volcano. 
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2.5.2. Ongoing challenges in ballistic risk communication 
Many volcanoes are tourist destinations with associated tourist facilities such as ski fields, 
accommodation and walking tracks (Erfurt-Cooper 2011). One challenge of communicating 
ballistic risk is to transient populations, especially tourists and other visitors. Tourists spend 
only a short amount of time in areas (hours to weeks) and often have little knowledge of the 
hazards or the available protection resources (Murphy and Bayley 1989; Drabek 1995; Burby 
and Wagner 1996; Bird et al. 2010). They often rely on tourism operators/employees/guides to 
inform them of volcanic hazards and the correct actions to take in an eruption (Leonard et al. 
2008; Bird et al. 2010). This is evident at Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu where guides are frequently 
relied on to communicate ballistic hazard and safe areas to approach around the volcano, and 
at Tongariro Volcano, New Zealand where transport operators can give important information 
to 85% of all those hiking the Tongariro Alpine Crossing (TAC). However, tourism staff may 
also be somewhat transient, meaning that they may need to be regularly educated, trained or 
updated on volcanic hazards, appropriate responses and emergency procedures so that they can 
pass the message down to their patrons (Leonard et al. 2008; Bird et al. 2010; Williams and 
Keys 2013). Additionally, education material such as pamphlets and hazard maps on volcanic 
hazards should not only be available at tourism businesses but mechanisms should be in place 
than ensure that the hazard information is relayed to these transient populations.  
 
Another ongoing challenge in communicating ballistic hazard is the lack of warning time 
associated with events that have little precursory activity, in which ballistics are typically one 
of the main hazards. In this scenario volcanic alert levels and bulletins may not be released prior 
to eruption. Instead, visitors and stakeholders would have to rely on their knowledge of the 
potential hazards and the response actions to take, especially if there are no real-time warning 
systems. This places more emphasis and weight on the availability of background hazard maps 
with messaging covering actions in events up to this size, signage around the volcano (in 
language(s) appropriate for the audience to comprehend, especially if there is a large proportion 
of visitors who speak a different language), on pamphlets distributed to businesses and visitors 
actually reading them, and through communication with their guides. Many visitors to the TAC 
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still assume that they do not need to be concerned because they expect the area to be closed if 
it is unsafe or to be advised it was unsafe (Keys 2015).  
 
We present the various ballistic risk management and communication approaches taken at four 
volcanoes: Upper Te Maari, Tongariro Volcanic Complex, New Zealand; Yasur Volcano, 
Vanuatu; Sakurajima Volcano, Japan and Mt. Ontake, Japan (Table 2.2). These volcanoes have 
been chosen for their variation in: frequency of eruption (Sakurajima and Yasur frequently 
erupt, while Upper Te Maari and Mt Ontake have longer repose periods), available resources 
(Yasur has less monitoring equipment and hazard information available than the other three 
examples), eruptive styles – Yasur predominantly erupts bombs from small Strombolian 
explosions; compared with phreatic eruptions from Mt Ontake and Upper Te Maari and 
Vulcanian eruptions from Sakurajima that erupt blocks over a larger area, and the similarity in 
eruptions but with very different consequences between Upper Te Maari and Mt Ontake. 
Additionally, all of these volcanoes are relatively accessible and attract large numbers of 
tourists each year. 
Table 2.2: Comparison of the four case studies and their risk management and communication strategies 
 
 Upper Te Maari Yasur Sakurajima Mt Ontake 
Dominant eruptive 
style Hydrothermal  Strombolian  Vulcanian Phreatic 
Recurrence 




erupting  ~13 years  
Duration of 
precursory activity 




seismicity   













visitors per day 
Hazard map with 
ballistics 
Background and 





zones Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Volcanic Alert 
Levels Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education material Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Volcano 
monitoring Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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rim of volcano 
Concrete shelters 
around island, 
evacuation ports  
Mountain lodges 
and shrines (not 
reinforced). Tracks 
near active craters 
Community 
engagement Yes In progress Yes Yes 










maps are being 
updated 
Last update of 
hazard map was in 
2010. 
New hazard map 
released 
November 2015   
Signage around 
volcano Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Volcano warnings, 
alert bulletins and 
communication 
with external 
agencies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
2.6. Case studies 
2.6.1. 2012 eruptions of Upper Te Maari, Tongariro, New Zealand 
On the 6th August 2012, Upper Te Maari Crater, one of the many vents on Tongariro volcano, 
New Zealand, erupted for the first time in over 100 years (Scott and Potter 2014). The 
hydrothermal eruption produced multiple pyroclastic surges, an ~8 km high ash plume and 
ejected thousands of ballistic blocks (Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Lube et al. 2014; Pardo et al. 2014). 
Blocks were distributed over a 6 km2 area, affecting ~2.6 km of the popular Tongariro Alpine 
Crossing (TAC), a walking track frequented by around 100,000 people a year (Fitzgerald et al. 
2014). Additionally, Ketetahi Hut, an overnight hut along the TAC, was severely damaged by 
ballistics. Fortunately, the eruption occurred at night, in winter (the low season) and in bad 
weather, resulting in no hikers along the TAC or staying at Ketetahi Hut (both around 1.5 km 
away from the vent and well within the affected area). A smaller eruption followed on 21 
November 2012, though ballistics and pyroclastic surges were confined to within a well posted 
risk management zone 1 km from the vent and did not affect the TAC. 
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Ballistics were a known hazard from the active vents of Tongariro, witnessed in the 1974-5 
Ngauruhoe eruptions (Nairn and Self 1978). As such they were described on the background 
hazard map for the volcano (Figure 2.3a). The map, published in 2007, consists of a summit 
hazard zone around each active vent, encompassing gas and ballistics at radii of 2-3 km for 
different vents based on experience of ballistic ranges in past eruptions at Tongariro National 
Park. Work is underway to develop ballistic and life safety models to better inform zone radius. 
Pyroclastic density currents (PDC’s) and lava flows are not included in a hazard zone but are 
mentioned as a possibility in all valleys. Ashfall is stated as a hazard that could occur any place 
on the map. Text is provided, with instructions including to move quickly down off the 
mountain and away from summit hazard areas, though ballistics-specific advice was not 
provided (GNS Science 2007). The background hazard map with associated instructions was 
permanently posted at the entrances to the walking tracks up the volcano, was available on the 
GNS and DOC websites as well as on flyers at many of the tourist hubs (Leonard et al. 2008; 
2014). The TAC hiking track cuts through most of the summit hazard zones, where access has 
been open at background levels. One hut, Ketetahi Hut, is located within the summit hazard 
zone, though is not reinforced to protect against ballistic impact.  
 
Unrest was observed at the volcano up to three weeks before the eruption, initially in the form 
of increased seismicity and then increased magmatic gas content (Jolly et al. 2014a). In response 
the Volcanic Alert Level was raised from 0 to 1 (indicating unrest). Seismicity declined in the 
days prior to eruption and thus the TAC remained open to tourists (Jolly et al. 2014b), with 
seismicity reoccurring only ~5 minutes before the event (Jolly et al. 2014a). In the build-up to 
the eruption, a decision was made to complete response plans and create a crisis hazard map 
initially for the whole volcanic massif with some focus on the northern flank of Tongariro. 
However, it was not publicly available before the August 6th eruption (Leonard et al. 2014). 
GNS volcanic alert bulletins were also produced, communicating updates on the precursory 
phenomena observed at Tongariro (Volcanic Alert Bulletins TON-2012/01 – 04; Figure 2.5e). 
Meetings and other discussions were held with the local residents and businesses involved with 
the TAC to discuss the situation and future scenarios. Being wintertime, there was very little 
use of the track. As there was no one on the hiking trail during the eruption it is difficult to 
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assess the success of the hazard communication strategies, and these strategies would have been 
different during summer months with heavy track use. 
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Figure 2.5: Risk communication methods used at Tongariro, New Zealand. A. Electronic signs 
communicating risk level and track closure at entrances to the volcano and where it crosses the AVHZ. B. 
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Signs advising area of increased hazard including a track-specific AVHZ hazard map. C. Additional 
information on volcanic hazards at Tongariro (including ballistics), initially handed out to all hikers, 
provided on Department of Conservation website. D. Geonet website showing monitoring data such as 
Volcanic Alert Level, seismic drums and visuals of the volcano. E. A Volcanic Alert Bulletin issued on the 
GeoNet website and distributed to media following the 2012 Upper Te Maari eruption 
 
Following the August event, some of the local population evacuated for the night and the TAC 
was closed for two months due to the risk of further eruption. Within this two-month period an 
updated hazard and risk assessment was completed (Jolly et al. 2014b). This involved a 
combination of reviewing the eruptive record to understand eruption frequency and magnitude, 
and expert elicitation by GNS staff (the institute responsible for monitoring volcanoes and 
assessing their hazard/risk) working closely with the land manager (Department of 
Conservation) to produce three possible future eruption scenarios (a 21 November size eruption, 
a 6 August size eruption, and a magnitude larger eruption) and associated probabilities of these 
occurring. Probabilities were re-assessed every week immediately after eruption, which was 
subsequently extended to every month, then every three months as time passed. Hazard extent 
was considered for ballistics and PDC’s for each scenario, exposure time along the affected 
area, and the vulnerability (probability of fatality) of an individual to each hazard (using the 
area of hazard around an individual impact for ballistics, and the presence of a person in the 
path of a PDC), to calculate the combined risk of fatality for all scenarios (Jolly et al. 2014b). 
 
Initial assessments suggested that ballistics were the main hazard to life from the eruption, 
though detailed mapping was not able to be carried out until months later when risk levels had 
decreased (Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Jolly et al. 2014b). The Department of Conservation (DOC), 
the agency responsible for hazard and risk management at Tongariro, began to implement risk 
management as part of a recovery programme. The risk assessments by Jolly et al. (2014b) 
became an important tool for making decisions about reopening. A new, event-specific Te 
Maari hazard map was created using mapped deposits and the most likely hazard scenarios, in 
which the main hazard zone was increased to a 3km radius (choosing the larger potential radius 
based on historic events) down-slope and deliberately renamed the Active Volcanic Hazard 
Zone (AVHZ) to distinguish it from the former map (Figure 2.3b). It included ballistics, 
explosions, pyroclastic density currents, lahars, gas and rockfall (Jolly et al. 2014b). The 
accompanying text to the crisis hazard map was also updated, with a ballistic specific 
instruction to ‘seek immediate shelter from flying rocks if an explosion occurs’ (GNS Science 
2012). The map was released to the public alongside a Volcanic Alert Bulletin describing the 
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changes made to the map and the source of the data (Volcanic Alert Bulletin TON-2012/23). 
This was distributed to the media (print, television, web and radio) to inform a wider audience 
(Leonard et al. 2014). Additionally, the map was posted at either ends of the track and where it 
crossed the boundaries of the AVHZ. Cordons, initially manned, were established at either ends 
of the TAC to prevent hikers from entering. Later, the cordon was moved to Emerald Lakes (on 
the edge of the 3 km Volcanic Hazard Zone) as the track was partially reopened. With declining 
risk of further eruption (based on the trend of the eruption probability estimates made by GNS 
to estimate how the expert elicitation might evolve over time), the track was fully opened 5 ½ 
months after the 21 November eruption.  
 
DOC also published educational information on the eruption hazard at Te Maari including 
further advice on actions to take in an eruption (Figure 2.5c). This included to ‘stop, look for 
flying rocks’, to ‘find shelter behind something – banks, ridges or in hollows’, to not turn away 
from ‘flying rocks unless you are sure they will not hit you’ and to ‘get out of the Hazard Zone 
along one of the indicated escape routes’ (Department of Conservation 2012). In October 2013 
electronic warning signs were installed that informed hikers of the status of the volcano – a red 
flashing light meant danger-turn back, orange elevated risk and green normal volcanic activity 
(Jolly et al. 2014b, Figure 2.5a). A survey of 203 hikers on the TAC in March – May 2014 
indicated that most people saw these signs when activated red and understood the messages 
irrespective of their native language (Keys 2015). A reinforced public shelter and warden’s 
quarters was one option being considered to replace the damaged Ketetahi Hut. Now the 
favoured option is to replace it with facilities outside the AVHZ. 
 
2.6.2. Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu 
Yasur Volcano is a frequently erupting basaltic scoria cone located on Tanna Island, Vanuatu 
(Cronin and Sharp 2002). Strombolian and Vulcanian eruptions have been relatively continuous 
since 1774 (Eissen et al. 1991). Ballistics are the main hazard produced by these eruptions, 
responsible for multiple fatalities in the past (Baxter and Gresham 1997). Yasur is one of 
Vanuatu’s main tourist attractions with some twenty thousand people visiting the crater rim 
each year. The vast majority of people are guided up the volcano by local guides to watch the 
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explosions occur, with a main viewing area only 150 m from the crater’s inner rim. As the 
majority of people in the area are transient tourists, guides are often relied upon to relay hazard 
and risk information to their patrons. Volcanic alert levels (VALs) and bulletins are posted on 
the Vanuatu Meteorology and Geo-Hazards Department (VMGD) website when the behaviour 
of the volcano changes. These sometimes include hazards maps that provide the locations of 
where bombs have been observed or are likely to impact, and often caution the public to 
approach the crater or hazardous areas with care. Maps also urge visitors, tourist agencies and 
communities to seriously consider the information provided prior to ascending Yasur (Vanuatu 
Geohazards Observatory 2009). However, advice or instructions are not given for what to do if 
caught in an area where ballistics are landing. A hazard map is displayed at the carpark before 
the ascent up the cone, highlighting the 1999 lava bomb impact zone and the observation 
location for each volcanic alert level – as the alert level increases so does the distance of the 
observation position from the cone (i.e. restriction zones are emplaced). In addition, visitors to 
Yasur are warned by a sign to ‘Think Safety’ before ascending the crater rim, though no further 
instructions or information is provided. As it is frequently erupting, it is assumed that visitors 
accept the risk that they are entering into an active volcanic hazard zone.  
 
An updated risk management framework has been developed from 2012 to 2016 including 
updated bulletins and VALs, background and safety (crisis) hazard maps, and tourist 
information including education and safety map information. This is associated with an upgrade 
of Vanuatu’s active volcanoes to real-time warning (at the time of writing this included a 
seismometer and webcam on Yasur and daily OMI satellite monitoring of SO2 emissions; VGO 
2014), supported by the New Zealand Aid Programme and GNS Science in partnership with 
VMGD. This integrated framework allows for pre-planning of safety zones related to ballistics 
and other hazards, and integration with warning products such as bulletins, VAL and tourist 
information. Ballistic zone ranges will initially be based on historic event ranges but will be 
updated to include the modelling being developed in New Zealand, once available. 
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2.6.3. Sakurajima Volcano, Japan 
Another frequently active volcano in which ballistics are a major hazard is Sakurajima Volcano, 
Japan. Continuous Vulcanian eruptions have occurred since 2009 from the andesitic composite 
cone (Japan Meteorological Agency 2013b). Sakurajima is constantly monitored by the 
Sakurajima Volcano Observatory and is considered to be one of the best monitored volcanoes 
in Japan (GSJ 2013). When activity changes, alert levels are posted on the Japan Meteorological 
Agency (JMA) website for the public to view. Many people live in close proximity to the 
volcano (~4,900 within 5 km of the volcano) and millions visit the Kagoshima-Sakurajima area 
each year (3,702,000 in 2010; Japan Meteorological Agency 2013b), thus JMA and Kagoshima 
City released a volcanic hazard map with additional information in 2010. This map was 
distributed to local citizens and posted around the volcano. Three relevant zones are delineated 
on the map: the first is a 2 km radius (from the active craters) restricted area in which both 
residents and tourists are restricted from entering at all times; the second is ~3 km away from 
the active vents showing the area expected to be inundated with volcanic bombs in a ‘strong 
eruption’, and lastly a 6 km radius extends around the active vents where ‘volcanic rock’ is 
likely to impact from a ‘great eruption’ (Kagoshima City 2010). Definitions for ‘strong 
eruption’ and ‘great eruption’ are not provided, nor is an explanation of the data that these zones 
are based on. The hazard map also includes societal components such as important landmarks 
i.e. schools and the visitor centre, and evacuation buildings and ports. The other half of the map 
consists of information on precursory phenomena likely to be felt and who to call if detected; 
how volcanic warnings will be disseminated, and the measures needed to be taken; what the 
five volcanic alert levels are/what activity is expected and the consequent actions needed to be 
taken; information on major historic eruptions and recent activity; and evacuation procedures. 
An English version of the map is available in addition to the original in Japanese. This 
information is also available on the official tourism website of Kagoshima City 
(http://www.city.kagoshima.lg.jp/soumu/shichoshitu/kokusai/en/emergency/sakurajima.html). 
Ballistics (called ‘cinders’) are additionally listed on the site as a possible volcanic hazard 
accompanied by a description, particle size and travel distance. To prepare for a future eruption 
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Three other notable risk communication and mitigation measures have been implemented at 
Sakurajima. A Volcano Disaster Prevention Council was created as a means of communication 
to discuss disaster prevention measures between volcanologists, local government, JMA, and 
other invested agencies 
(http://www.data.jma.go.jp/svd/vois/data/fukuoka/506_Sakurajima/506_bousai.html). 
Secondly, signs instructing people on the distance and direction to the nearest eruption safe 
house and evacuation port have been posted around the volcano. Lastly, concrete roofed shelters 
have been built around the island to protect visitors from falling ballistics (Erfurt-Cooper 2010). 
2.6.4. 2014 eruption of Mt Ontake, Japan 
Mt Ontake is a stratovolcano located on the island of Honshu, Japan (Japan Meteorological 
Agency 2013a). It is not a continuously active volcano with four eruptions (all phreatic) in its 
historic record (1979, 1991, 2007 and 2014; Japan Meteorological Agency 2013a; Smithsonian 
Institution 2013). Mt Ontake straddles the boundary of two prefectures – Gifu and Nagano, with 
trails on either side. Both prefectures have developed hazard maps for two eruption scenarios 
that include ballistics – the first a phreatic eruption similar in size to the 1979 eruption (VEI 2) 
and the second a larger eruption on the scale of 90,000 – 20,000-year recurrence interval 
(Nagano hazard map: vivaweb2.bosai.go.jp/v-hazard/L_read/53ontakesan/53ontake_2h03-
L.pdf; Gifu hazard map: http://vivaweb2.bosai.go.jp/v-
hazard/L_read/53ontakesan/53ontake_2h01-L.pdf). In both maps, ballistic hazard is defined by 
a 4 km asymmetric zone around an asymmetric vent area encompassing the 1979 vents - the 
same vents that erupted in the 1991 and 2007 eruptions. The parameter by which the zone is 
based on is not provided (e.g. maximum travel distance, spatial density of impacts) and no 
advice accompanies the hazard map, though a residents’ handbook was printed that included 
examples of what ballistics are and how far they can travel. The maps and handbooks are 
available on the NIED database and the prefectural government websites, though the map is not 
signposted around the volcano.  
 
Mt Ontake is constantly monitored by the JMA, with seismometers, GPS stations, tiltmeters, 
cameras and infrasonic microphones (Japan Meteorological Agency 2013a). In addition, 
preparedness communication measures also include Volcanic Alert Levels, in place since 2008 
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(Japan Meteorological Agency 2013a). Similarly to other volcanoes, these VALs range from 1 
– 5 and include whether the alert level is a warning or forecast, the target area (e.g. crater area 
or more distal residential areas), the expected volcanic activity and phenomena with examples 
of previous cases, actions needed to be taken and also keywords accompanying the level (e.g. 
level 5 with ‘evacuate’). 
 
The 27 September 2014 phreatic eruption occurred at lunchtime on a busy autumn day when 
~340 hikers were on the mountain (Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Multiple pyroclastic surges were 
produced, travelling up to 2.5 km from vent, in addition to ballistics that impacted up to 1 km 
from the vent (Kaneko et al. 2016; Tsunematsu et al. 2016). Fifty-eight people were killed in 
the eruption, 55 most likely the result of ballistic trauma relatively close to the summit, with 
five still missing (as of 24 June 2016; Tsunematsu et al. 2016). An increase in summit seismicity 
was noted 16 days prior to the eruption resulting in the JMA releasing notices about volcanic 
activity, though activity was not at levels significant enough to raise the Volcanic Alert Level 
(there needed to be signs of deformation, which were not recorded until just prior to eruption; 
The Japan News, 26/10/14; Ui 2015). The eruption was largely unexpected with 11 minutes of 
precursory tremor, and uplift detected only seven minutes before the event (Ui 2015). This was 
a much shorter period of precursory activity than previous eruptions. The 1979 eruption was 
preceded by earthquake swarms for a year and five months. A month of seismicity was noted 
prior to the 1991 eruption, increasing in frequency just days before the event. And the 2007 
eruption was preceded by inflation and seismicity for three months, accompanied by increasing 
fumarolic activity the week prior (Japan Meteorological Agency 2013a). Longer periods of 
precursory activity allow time for warnings to be issued. JMA released warnings prior to the 
1991 and 2007 events, although the resulting eruptions were very small, only affected the 
immediate area and occurred in winter outside the climbing season (Japan Meteorological 
Agency 2013a). However, if it had been possible to issue a warning when the precursory 
activity increased on the day of the 2014 eruption, it is unlikely that it would have resulted in 
no fatalities. Any evacuation warning prior to an event would need to occur at least an hour 
before the event and be immediately transmitted to all hikers on the summit area as it takes over 
an hour for hikers to move out of the ballistic hazard zone. Nonetheless, even a short warning 
time may have provided more hikers time to get to shelter. 
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Following the eruption, the Volcanic Alert Level was increased to 3, warning people not to 
approach the volcano (as access was restricted), and that blocks may be ejected up to 1 km from 
vent (based on previous eruptions). Signs were posted around the volcano telling people to 
“keep out” of the restricted area. Search and Rescue teams were deployed to rescue the injured 
hikers and those that sheltered in the buildings at the summit, and to recover the dead. Those 
that sheltered in the buildings around the summit survived the 2014 eruption, while many of 
the fatalities occurred due to hikers choosing to take photos and video of the eruption outside 
instead of running to the nearest hut. Half of the people autopsied by one doctor were found 
with cell phones in hand while one person’s camera was found with a photo taken four minutes 
after the eruption occurred (Mainichi Shimbun 10/10/14). Some then attempted to shelter 
around the summit shrine which they could not gain access to (the summit shrine is only open 
from the beginning of July to early September). Fatalities also occurred in exposed areas where 
there were no buildings in sight to shelter within. Personal safety measures taken by exposed 
hikers saved lives. This included sheltering behind large rocks, placing backpacks on heads, 
and wearing hard hats provided inside the mountain huts (NHK 2015).  
 
Numerous risk management and communication tools have since been adopted. Prior to the 
eruption, Gifu and Nagano prefectures had separate commissions to manage volcanic activity 
from Mt Ontake. Following the 2014 eruption they have combined to form one commission for 
the entire volcano, improving communication between the prefectures and subsequently to the 
public. The commission, similar to the Sakurajima council, is comprised of volcanologists, 
local government, JMA and other interested agencies 
(http://www.pref.nagano.lg.jp/kisochi/kisochi-seisaku/ontakesan/kazanbousaikyougikai.html). 
The council ran its first eruption evacuation drill on 4th June 2015.  
 
Interviews conducted post-eruption showed that many climbers were unaware of the volcanic 
activity notices released, while of those that were aware 76% did not consider that they needed 
to be prepared for an eruption (The Japan News 26/10/14; Shinano Mainichi Shimbun 2015). 
JMA subsequently launched a website to provide climbers with its observations of the volcanic 
activity around Japan, in an attempt to improve communication to climbers. From the 1st April, 
2015 the Gifu Prefectural Government made it mandatory for all climbers of Ontake to submit 
a mountain climbing notification form prior to ascending Mt. Ontake, in an effort to improve 
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knowledge of the number and location of people on the mountain, and to improve 
communication in times of crisis by recording their emergency contact information 
(http://www.pref.gifu.lg.jp/English/tourism/mountain/). Kiso, a town in the Nagano Prefecture 
responsible for one of the mountain trails, has also installed loudspeakers in the mountain cabins 
prior to easing restrictions in September 2015 (The Japan Times 27/09/15). 
 
In November 2015, a new hazard map was released by the Ontakesan Volcano Disaster 
Prevention Council (the combined commission mentioned previously). It provides two ballistic 
hazard zones – one for a phreatic eruption that extends 2 km from the vent area, and one for a 
larger magmatic eruption, extending 4 km from the vent area 
(http://www.city.gero.lg.jp/hazardmap/#12/35.9073/137.5203). The zones are based on 
research completed for Mt Fuji on past ballistic distributions from phreatic and magmatic 
eruptions in Japan and around the world (Mount Fuji Disaster Prevention Council 2004). The 
asymmetric vent area has also been increased significantly, encompassing 3 km in length and 
~2 km in width. In addition, further research has been completed on the ballistic hazard 
produced in the eruption. Tsunematsu et al. (2016) describe an elongated distribution toward 
the N-NE resulting from an inclined ejection and topographic controls such as the shape of the 
valley the vents formed in. The spatial distribution was mapped from aerial photos by Kaneko 
et al. (2016) and delineated into four zones. The densest zone (A) encompasses areas with 
impact densities > 10 impacts per 5 x 5 m, decreasing in density with distance from the vent to 
Zone C which has between 0 and 2 impacts per 5 x 5 m. 
2.7. Discussion 
2.7.1. Understand the context and assess the risk 
We identify from review of literature and analysis of the four case study volcanoes (Table 2.2) 
that understanding the risk context is highly important for effective communication associated 
with ballistic hazard and risk. Establishing this context and identifying potential risks requires 
engagement with potential stakeholders, such as those which may be exposed or affected by 
ballistic, or other, volcanic hazards. Effective communication is an essential component of this. 
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Once these steps are complete, we then suggest that a ballistic risk assessment is undertaken to 
help underpin effective management and communication of ballistic hazard and risk. Best-
practice ballistic risk assessment generally consists of: 1) reviewing the volcano’s eruptive 
history to establish eruption frequency and eruption magnitude; 2) determining the nature and 
extent of past ballistic distributions; 3) exploring possible future ballistic distributions; 4) 
identifying assets exposed in the area; and 5) estimating the asset’s vulnerability. Once 
complete, risk can be evaluated, and appropriate management and communication strategies 
implemented. However, we stress that risk assessment alone cannot underpin effective 
communication of ballistic hazard and risk. But must be carried out in conjunction with the 
tools and strategies listed in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2.  
 
It is important to remember that every context is different and what works at one volcano does 
not necessarily mean it will work or is needed at another. An assessment for a frequently 
erupting, highly visited volcano where risk management organisations are well resourced will 
require a different approach compared with an infrequently active, rarely visited volcano in a 
country where there are few resources available for risk management. The scope and scale of 
risk management activities should be guided by the risk context and determine which and how 
risk management tools and strategies are used.  
2.7.2. Reflections on the four case study volcanoes 
All of the volcanoes studied are capable of causing injuries and fatalities from ballistics. The 
Mt Ontake 2014 eruption resulted in the most fatalities from any of the case studies and provides 
a chance to analyse why this was so with the aim of preventing it from occurring again. Multiple 
factors contributed to the high fatality rate: 
• The eruption happened in peak season when ~340 people were on the mountain.  
• Precursory activity only increased 11 minutes prior to eruption, resulting in an 
unexpected eruption. This meant no warning was able to be issued to the people on the 
summit and no closure of the summit prior to the event occurred. Previous eruptions 
had precursory events that gave more warning of the impending eruption underscoring 
that past history should not be solely relied on to predict outcomes of future unrest.   
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• The Alert Level was not raised following increased seismicity beginning 16 days before 
the eruption. A requirement for this to occur is the presence of ground deformation, 
which was not recorded until 7 minutes before the eruption.  
• Hikers chose to take images and video of the eruption instead of finding shelter. This 
decision may have been different had hazard maps been posted around the volcano with 
instructions on actions to take in an eruption.  
Fatalities from ballistics could occur at all of the case study volcanoes. However, a scenario 
with fatalities on the scale seen at Ontake is unlikely from Sakurajima due to the 2 km restriction 
zone. Yasur is visited by much fewer tourists than Ontake so it is unlikely to see as many 
fatalities from one event as occurred at Ontake, although the lack of shelter, lack of hazard 
advice, and proximity to the vent means that ballistic casualties are still relatively likely at this 
volcano.  Work is ongoing to reduce this risk. The August 2012 eruption of Upper Te Maari is 
the most comparable to the Ontake eruption as it was largely unheralded and of the same 
explosivity. If the August 2012 eruption had occurred in peak tourist season, then a similar 
amount of fatalities as Ontake potentially could have occurred. 
2.7.3. Critical issues 
We identify the following critical issues for contemporary and future communication of 
volcanic ballistic risk, based on our review of literature and analysis of the four case study 
volcanoes. We note many of these issues transcend volcanic ballistics to include nearly all 
volcano types and volcanic hazards: 
• What is the most effective way to manage and communicate risk from volcanoes which 
are (highly) visited and/or settled which experience eruptions with very short and/or no 
meaningful warnings (e.g. Ontake, Te Maari)? This is a critical issue for managing 
ballistic risk, as eruptions with longer unrest phases typically allow evacuation of 
ballistic hazard zones before the eruption. 
• What are the most appropriate risk management and communication strategies for 
volcanoes where ballistic (and other) risk is present which have poorly understood 
eruptive histories and/or monitoring systems? 
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• Effective ballistic risk assessment requires greater understanding of a) the distribution 
of ballistic from a range of potential eruption styles, b) the effect of ballistics to people 
and other societal assets (vulnerability/fragility characteristics), and c) identification 
and (crucially) evaluation of what are the most appropriate mitigation actions to reduce 
ballistic risks before, during and after an eruption. 
• Successful management of ballistic risk requires effective engagement (of which 
communication is a keystone) between authorities responsible for managing risk at 
volcanoes, those people and organisations who may have economic, cultural and social 
connections with a volcano, and the scientific community who can help inform hazard 
and (sometimes) risk considerations. Organisational and governance frameworks to 
allow and facilitate this seem to be highly variable globally, but some relatively 
successful examples do exist (e.g. New Zealand). 
• How to manage future risk, particularly for volcanoes where there is significant existing 
use and/or strong pressure to utilise the resources through tourism (increasing visitor 
numbers to high risk areas), and agricultural and settlement pressure from population 
growth. 
2.8. Conclusions 
Ballistic projectiles ejected in explosive eruptions present a major proximal hazard to life, 
infrastructure and the environment. An increasing population living on or close to active 
volcanoes and a growing volcano tourism industry give rise to an increased number of people 
exposed to ballistic hazard, presenting a considerable need for detailed ballistic hazard and risk 
assessments, and specialised communication and management strategies. Recommended 
strategies would include at least the following: 
1) Hazard and risk assessments (ideally probabilistic) specific to the volcano in question, 
which include ballistics where appropriate, that are made available to emergency 
managers and decision makers with authors/scientists available to answer questions and 
advise where necessary and practical; 
2) The inclusion of ballistic hazard zones in hazard maps with accompanying advice on 
what to do. Maps should be updated in a crisis to reflect new information and readily 
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available through a range of media. These maps should continue to be updated after the 
event when detailed scientific studies are complete;  
3) Volcano monitoring systems to monitor volcanic activity and indicate when a volcano 
is in unrest; 
4) The use of signage around the volcano to communicate ballistic hazard and risk, 
integrated with other hazard advice, including warning systems where practical, and 
with a focus on effectiveness of communication rather than just providing information; 
5) The use of volcanic alert bulletins, media releases or reports to communicate ballistic 
hazard and risk in crisis phases; 
6) Open, sufficiently frequent communication between scientists, stakeholders, emergency 
managers and local communities in which updates and training are provided, and 
informed input made into management and mitigation measures. 
 
These strategies may vary with eruptive state (quiescence or crisis), frequency of eruptions, 
availability of resources, and whether ballistics are the main hazard at the particular volcano.  
In addition to the strategies mentioned in this chapter, further work is needed to test and update 
the advice provided to visitors on the actions to take in a ballistic eruption, in particular personal 
protective measures. Effort should also be made to provide consistent advice at all volcanoes 
on the actions to be taken, depending on the volcanic hazards involved. This way the 
information would be reinforced with visits to different volcanoes and increase the likelihood 
of visitors acting correctly. 
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Preamble (Chapter 3) 
The previous chapter highlighted the ways ballistic hazard has been managed and 
communicated around the world and recommended strategies to address ballistic hazard and 
risk in the future. It described how ballistic deposits had been mapped and assessed and used 
four case studies to investigate how ballistic hazard is managed and communicated at volcanoes 
with different eruption frequencies, styles and exposure.  
 
Chapter 3 addresses the lack of spatial density, ballistic size and distribution data highlighted 
in Chapter 2 that limits our understanding of ballistic hazard and the effectiveness of DRR 
strategies. The ballistic field around Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu is mapped, and the spatial and 
temporal distribution of ballistics is analysed. Findings indicate that spatial density and ballistic 
size varies with distance and direction from the vents. Directionality in explosions is found in 
the ballistic distribution and explosion footage, however it changes over time. These 
characteristics are important when considering hazard assessments and DRR methods. 
 
Chapter 3 has been submitted and is in review with the journal Volcanica 
 
Conceptual diagram showing the objectives of the thesis with the objectives addressed in 
Chapter 3 in green and black.
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Chapter Three – Volcanic ballistic projectile deposition 
from a continuously erupting volcano: Yasur 
Volcano, Vanuatu 
3.1. Abstract 
Volcanic ballistic projectiles are the main hazard to life and infrastructure from Strombolian 
eruptions. This eruption style is a tourist drawcard, exposing people to ballistic hazard. Most of 
the research on ballistics to date has been focussed on understanding how ballistics form and 
their trajectory. However, little focus has been placed on how ballistics are distributed within 
ballistic fields or the inclusion of this data into hazard and risk assessments. In this study we 
used a drone to image the ballistic field, and cameras to record explosions at Yasur Volcano, 
Vanuatu from 28 July to the 2 August and 17 to the 19 October 2016. We present the mapped 
distributions from the two trips, how the field changes with distance and direction from the 
vent, and how eruption dynamics influence these changes. Our evidence for directionality 
results in considerable variation in summit ballistic hazard and is an important consideration 
for ballistic hazard and risk assessments. 
3.2. Introduction 
Erupting volcanoes are increasingly frequented by tourists (Erfurt-Cooper, Sigurdsson and 
Lopes 2015). For example, Yasur volcano, on the SE of Tanna Island, Vanuatu, attracts ~50 
tourists a day, who spend often two or more hours watching the frequent Strombolian 
explosions from the crater rim. Such proximity to the explosions exposes visitors and guides to 
multiple volcanic hazards, with volcanic ballistic projectiles (VBPs or ballistics) globally the 
most common cause of volcanic fatalities for tourists (Brown et al. 2017). Ballistics (bombs 
and blocks) can range from a few centimetres to tens of metres in diameter (Nairn and Self 
1978; Bower and Woods 1996; Gurioli et al. 2013; Andronico et al. 2015; Tsunematsu et al. 
2016), can travel tens to hundreds of metres per second (Fudali and Melson 1972; Yamagishi 
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and Feebrey 1994; Pioli et al. 2008; Taddeucci et al. 2012) and up to ~10 km from vent, 
although they are usually limited to within 5 km (Minakami 1942; Blong 1984; Kilgour et al. 
2010; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Gurioli et al. 2013). Their high impact and thermal 
energies make them a potentially lethal hazard (Blong 1984; Baxter and Gresham 1997; 
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012; Wardman et al. 2012; Tsunematsu et al. 2016), capable of 
damaging exposed vehicles (Global Volcanism Program 2001; Wardman et al. 2012; 
Andronico et al. 2015), buildings (Booth 1979; Pistolesi et al. 2008; Jenkins et al. 2014; 
Williams et al. 2017), infrastructure (Pistolesi et al. 2008; Wardman et al. 2012; Andronico et 
al. 2015) and agriculture (Stern et al. 2007; Wardman et al. 2012). Three of the 367 globally 
recorded fatalities from ballistic strike have occurred at Yasur (Brown et al. 2017).  
 
Risk reduction and mitigation measures (such as land use planning, exclusion zones, protective-
wear, shelters, communication and education products) are key to reducing risk to visitors, 
though to be most effective they must be supported by robust hazard and risk assessment 
(Fitzgerald et al. 2017). Ballistic hazard assessments determine the likelihood of ballistic-
producing eruptions and the likely affected areas (Thouret et al. 2000; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia 
et al. 2012). Ballistic risk assessments go one step further and determine the likelihood of 
specific consequences occurring (e.g. fatalities, casualties, damage) due to the exposure to 
ballistics (Blong 1996). A common ballistic risk management approach has been to simply 
‘avoid’ being exposed to ballistic hazard through use of exclusion and/or restricted-access 
zones (Fitzgerald et al. 2017). However, increasing tourism and other activities on active 
summit areas leads to greater exposure to the hazard, and there are increasing regulatory 
requirements and societal expectations to inform users about the risk to which they may be 
exposed (Jolly et al. 2014; Deligne et al. 2018). These have driven the requirement to more 
accurately assess risk so that it may be evaluated and treated within a risk management 
framework. Yet, our understanding of ballistic hazard is relatively limited. A lack of empirical 
mapping of how ballistics are distributed in space (ballistic fields) during explosive eruptions 
is notable with only a few fully mapped ballistic fields reported (e.g. Swanson et al. 2012; 
Gurioli et al. 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014). The main reasons for this are field time constraints 
(mapping every individual ballistic on foot is time-consuming), the high risk involved in 
mapping proximal vent areas especially during unrest or eruption phases, the resolution 
limitations of readily available remote sensing imagery, and the limited geological preservation 
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of ballistic fields due to cover from ash and lapilli and subsequent erosion. Instead, published 
ballistic distribution maps often only show the maximum travel distance or extent of the field 
(Minakami 1942; Nairn and Self 1978; Yamagishi and Feebrey 1994; Robertson et al. 1998). 
This does not give a complete understanding of the hazard and can lead to inaccurate 
estimations of risk, particularly without the knowledge of spatial density. Sufficiently high-
resolution aerial photos help get a wider understanding of field characteristics, making mapping 
the field possible and allowing for targeted field investigations (to supplement and check the 
accuracy of photo mapped data, maintain detail and reduce uncertainty in identifying ballistics) 
and have been used to map ballistic fields (Breard et al. 2014; Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Kaneko et 
al. 2016). Previously this has been accomplished using planes and helicopters. However, the 
use of these aircraft is expensive and can be a limitation for scientists with limited resources.  
 
Drones are a tool that can be used to assess geological hazards (Gomez and Purdie 2016) while 
reducing the risk to scientists. They offer particular capabilities that lend themselves to volcano 
observation and monitoring. This includes: (1) access to dangerous or hard to reach areas while 
keeping scientists at a safer distance from the hazard; (2) portability; (3) ability to produce 
higher resolution outputs compared with those taken by larger aircraft such as helicopters, by 
being able to get closer to features; and (4) relatively low cost. For example, drones have been 
used in volcanic research to thermally map a geothermal valley (Harvey et al. 2016), observe 
crater activities in active volcanoes (Patterson et al. 2005; Jordan 2015), map active lava flows 
and model future flow paths (Turner et al. 2017), determine the likely location of magma and 
dykes using aeromagnetic surveys (Kaneko et al. 2011), measure the gas composition 
(Shinohara 2013) and flux from a volcanic plume (McGonigle et al. 2008), 3D image a volcanic 
plume (Gomez and Kennedy 2017), and survey land changes after volcanic eruptions (Nakano 
et al. 2014). To the best of our knowledge, no-one has utilised a drone to map ballistic fields.  
 
In this paper we present the results of two field campaigns from 28 July to the 2 August and 17 
to the 19 October 2016 to map the ballistic field and understand the ballistic hazard at Yasur. 
The study objectives were to: (1) use drones and photogrammetry to determine the distribution 
and varying spatial intensity of the hazard (both the number and size of ballistics) constrained 
between the two flights; and (2) evaluate explosion frequency and dynamics from video footage 
to understand how this influences the ballistic hazard distribution at Yasur. The results 
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presented here will add to the limited data available on ballistic distributions from Strombolian 
eruptions, improve our knowledge of how ballistic fields vary with distance and direction from 
vent and over time, and improve understanding on the causes of heterogeneity around a vent as 
well as in a field. The paper is structured into four main sections. We describe our methodology, 
followed by results which are subdivided into Section 3.4.1 Spatial Distribution containing 
mapping results and Section 3.4.2 Eruption Dynamics containing video and observation derived 
results. We discuss the relationship between ballistic size and distance from vent, how spatial 
density changes with direction around the vents, differences between the two data sets, and 
finally, we describe the hazard/risk implications of our results. 
 
3.2.1. Eruptive History 
Yasur is a basaltic trachy-andesite scoria cone 361 m a.s.l. (at the summit), situated within the 
>20 ka Siwi caldera at the north-western edge of the Yenkahe resurgent dome (Métrich et al. 
2011; Merle et al. 2013; Gaudin et al. 2014; Brothelande et al. 2015; Battaglia et al. 2016).  
Present-day Yasur is composed of a 660 m diameter crater subdivided into two sub-craters with 
three main vent areas (A and B in the southern sub-crater, and C in the northern sub-crater) 
(Nabyl et al. 1997; Oppenheimer et al. 2006; Kremers et al. 2012; Meier et al. 2015; Spina et 
al. 2015; Battaglia et al. 2016; Figure 3.1). It is evident that the positions of the vents migrate 
over time and the two southern vent areas (A and B) are alternately named by different authors. 
Drone footage from this study revealed a change in the number and position daily of vents in 
both the North and South craters. Thus, we have decided to adopt the Jolly et al. 2017 naming 
convention of simply North and South Crater.  
 
Firth et al. (2014) identified 3 stages of eruption from tephra stratigraphy and literature review: 
pre-700 AD, a variable frequency and intensity eruptive episode; from ~700 AD to 1270 AD a 
higher magnitude lower frequency episode; and from 1270 AD to the present a persistently 
active low magnitude high frequency episode. This most recent eruptive stage has been 
predominantly Strombolian with intermittent Vulcanian activity (Nabyl et al. 1997; Bani and 
Lardy 2007; Firth et al. 2014). Explosion frequency has been variable over the current high 
frequency stage. Meier et al. (2015) reported explosions several times a minute while Marchetti 
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et al. (2013) and Battaglia et al. (2016) reported a frequency of at least one explosion per minute. 
Kremers et al. (2013) report similar results of explosion recurrence under one minute (from 
Crater A). However, Vent Area B frequency ranged from minutes to days and Vent Area C had 
strong explosions every 10 minutes. Vent Area B explosion recurrence was reported to be on 
the minutes end of the range by Oppenheimer et al. (2006) with 13 explosions occurring over a 
15-minute period. Over a two-hour period, Bani et al. (2013) recorded 200 explosions from 
Vent Area B using a thermal infrared thermometer. Infrasound recordings reported by Le 




Figure 3.1: Location maps of Vanuatu (A) and the island of Tanna (B) with a blue star indicating where 
Yasur is. Yasur Volcano, the two sub-craters and the location of infrastructure are shown in C 
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3.3. Methodology 
Ballistic fields can cover large areas (Fudali and Melson 1972; Fitzgerald et al. 2014), making 
them difficult to map in detail due to the time needed to record all pertinent information from 
each ballistic (e.g. dimensions, lithology, crater formation, impact angle) and the sheer number 
of ballistics that are contained in the field (Fitzgerald et al. 2014). Aerial photography and 
photogrammetry allow for mapping to be done remotely, in detail over the whole area and in a 
much shorter time frame. In our study, a DJI Phantom 3 drone was flown over the crater and 
flanks of Yasur Volcano, capturing 3,863 images and covering an 0.82 km2 area from NE to S 
(Figure 3.2) at heights above the ground up to 60 m with a 12-megapixel camera. Time and 
equipment restrictions meant limiting flying to a 135° swath of the volcano, with the NE-S area 
chosen due to it encompassing the viewing areas, track, and carpark. Eight orthophotographs 
and accompanying DEMs were created from these images using Structure from Motion (SfM) 
software (PhotoScan) in high enough resolution to map individual ballistics. Flights were flown 
on autopilot (using the Map Pilot application) with flight paths created on an iPad in the field. 
Using Map Pilot ensured that photos were taken with sufficient overlap for SfM to be used and 
that no areas were missed. However, some flights were switched to manual towards the path 
end where there was a possibility of collision with the volcano flank (take off generally occurred 
at a lower elevation than the landing point and the DJI does not have the capability to adjust 
elevation mid-flight with changing topography). 
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Figure 3.2: The crater mid-point, 100 m radii and transects used to create the mapping squares. Also shown 
is the area that the drone imaged 
  
 
Geospatial data was collected using a Trimble R8 Real-time Kinematic Global Navigation 
Satellite System (RTK GNSS), with a base station set up at the edge of the car park (Figure 3.2) 
and linked to the drone imagery through ground control points taken at ground targets visible 
in the aerial images. 
 
Although RTK GNSS produces a typical location error in X, Y < 2-5 cm and < 10 cm in Z 
compared to single GNSS and GPS units, the SfM photogrammetric method relies on statistical 
approximation of the camera characteristics (Westoby et al. 2012) and on the resolution of the 
imagery (Gomez 2014). Therefore, even with GNSS RTK tie points, error can spread in 
between the ground control points and precisely aligning the produced orthophotographs and 
DEMs from the two trips can be challenging once imported into the ArcGIS environment. To 
make visual comparisons between the two orthophoto datasets easier and rectify the 
misalignment, the orthophotos and DEM sets were stacked in the GIS software ENVI and 
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exported as combined TIFFs. The stacks were then imported into ArcGIS where they were split 
into smaller areas (between 4 and 20 depending on the size of the area the original orthophoto 
covered) and georeferenced to each other. Splitting the layers resulted in more accurate 
georeferencing as it reduced the warping produced when the larger datasets were used.  
 
As the area captured in the orthophotos was too large to map all ballistics in the available 
timeframe, twenty-three 20 x 20 m squares (an area of 400 m2 for each square) were visually 
mapped from the orthophotos from the July/August trip and thirty from the October trip (as the 
latter covered a larger area). The squares were positioned at 100 m increments and along 
transects 22.5° apart radiating from a central point (hereafter called the crater mid-point) 
between the two craters to capture as much of the orthophoto area and variation in ballistic 
distribution around the volcano as possible (Figure 3.2). A central point between the two craters 
was chosen as it was not possible to distinguish which ballistic came from which vent. Spatial 
density contours were then applied to the mapped distributions using the spline tool in ArcGIS 
and best fit estimates. In addition to the location being recorded, ballistic dimension (taken from 
the largest axis) and whether an impact crater has been produced and its dimensions was also 
noted. Identification of ballistics was based on multiple factors though not all were required for 
identification. Factors included (1) morphology (sitting on the surface, distinct ballistic 
rounding or angularity), (2) colour differences (darker or lighter clasts compared to the ground 
surface), (3) round depressions around or near a ballistic indicating impact with the ground, and 
(4) disturbed material around a ballistic indicating an impact. Figure 3.3 illustrates this process, 
showing a mapping square pre- and post-ballistic identification. Comparison of the July/August 
and October orthophotos helped to identify new ballistics that had landed post July/August data 
collection and also confirmed if something was a ballistic (i.e. seeing it in a slightly different 
light or angle in a different orthophoto could help to confirm it was a ballistic and not a lighter 
patch of ground or autobreccia from the old lava flows on the flanks). Unfortunately due to time 
constraints in the field, we could not ground-truth the mapping squares to validate our mapping 
methodology and assess for resolution error. 
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Figure 3.3 Mapping square pre- and post-ballistic identification 
 
 
In addition to the drone flights, three GoPro Hero 3+ cameras with non-fish-eye lenses were set 
up around the crater rim to record eruption dynamics and frequency for 10 hours over 30 July 
to 1 August 2016. Each camera could see into the crater though not to the vents as crater walls 
blocked these from view. Where possible, we assessed the size and directionality of the 
explosions from the GoPro video footage. Multiple locations around the crater and concurrent 
filming from the cameras meant that directionality could be checked at another angle. 
Directionality was classified on the angle of the eruption jet in relation to landmarks around the 
crater (i.e. the viewing areas to the east and south). Explosions were sized based on the height 
that ballistics or a sustained tephra plume reached (small: a third of the way up the crater; 
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moderate: between a third of the crater height and the crater rim; large: above the crater rim). 
An anemometer (Kestrel 5500 L) was also assembled at the southern viewing area (Figure 3.1c) 
to record wind speed and direction every 1 to 5 minutes over 29 July to 1 August. Additionally, 
systematic observational logs were collected for one hour each day from the seating/viewing 
area in the SSE from 5 September to 16 October 2016 in between the two imaging trips. This 
record provided the source crater that any bombs were coming from, which direction they were 
landing and if they landed outside the crater rim. 
 
As part of concurrent studies (Jolly et al. 2017), temporary infrasound and seismic networks 
were set up around the cone. Two stations from these arrays (YIB22 and YS01), located ~700 
m from the vent area, are used in this paper to support changes in eruptive activity observed in 
video footage from the same time period. Peak event amplitudes for unfiltered infrasound data 
are analysed from YIB22 in a time-window from -5 to +10 s around an automatic network-
coincident STA/LTA trigger. We define triggers with 0.1–50 Hz filtered data using an STA 
length of 0.5 s, an LTA length of 40 s, and a coincident STA/LTA threshold of 3 on at least 2 
stations of a 3-element array. Real-Time Infrasonic Amplitude (RIAM) and Real-Time Seismic 
Amplitude (RSAM) were also recorded and calculated as the 10-minute mean of absolute 
amplitude of 0.1–50 Hz filtered data (Endo and Murray, 1991). 
 
3.4. Results and Analysis 
This section is divided into two subsections: 3.4.1 Spatial Distribution, which reports results 
from the aerial mapping; and 3.4.2 Eruption Dynamics which conveys the results from the 
GoPro footage and visual observations. 
3.4.1. Spatial distribution 
We present two ballistic distributions from Yasur volcano. The first is of ballistics deposited 
between 28 July and 19 October 2016 (hereafter referred to as the two-month distribution), by 
mapping ballistics that appear only in the October images and that are not present in the 
July/August images. The second was the distribution of all observable ballistics in October, 
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Figure 3.4: Ballistic spatial density (number of ballistics x 10-2 per m2) from the deposition over two months 
(A) and everything on the ground in the later October images (B). The aerial imagery captured from the 
two trips is layered beneath the map contours 
 
 
From the two-month distribution, 1,550 ballistics were identified from 23 mapping squares 
(each square 400 m2 in area). Ballistic diameters ranged from 5 (the minimum size that could 
be distinguished) to 304 cm with a mean of 43 cm. The number of ballistics per m2 drops rapidly 
as distance from the crater increases, from 182 x 10-2/m2 at 200 m from the crater mid-point 
(defined in section 2) to an average of 6.69 x10-2/m2 at a distance of 400 m (Figure 3.4a). Greater 
than 500 m from the crater mid-point the number of ballistics decreases to between 0 and 0.5 
x10-2 ballistics per m2 in most azimuths. The distribution of ballistics also shows a directionality 
in the S and SSE azimuths where a greater number of ballistics exist between 300 and 500 m 
from the crater mid-point than in other azimuths (ballistic numbers ranging 124 – 3.4 x10-2/m2 
compared to 23 – 0 x10-2/m2, respectively) (Figure 3.4a). The E and ESE azimuth also have 
more ballistics at 400 m from the crater mid-point than the SE. However, Figure 3.5a shows the 
SE having the largest median ballistic diameter at 300 m that decreases away towards the ESE 
and SSE, creating a lobe that might indicate directionality. Median diameter was used as there 
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are large ballistic outliers that skew the mean value. Analysis of the size distribution also 
revealed an increase in median diameter at 500 m following a trend of decreasing size in the 
SSE azimuth. 
 
The total October distribution shows similar patterns as the two-month distribution. From 30 
mapping squares (400 m2 areas) 5481 ballistics were mapped. Ballistics ranged from 3 to 353 
cm in diameter with an average of 34 cm. Ballistic density decreases with distance from the 
crater from an average of 138.5 x10-2/m2 at 200 m from the crater mid-point to 4 x10-2/m2 at 
700 m, though not as rapidly as seen in the two-month distribution (Figures 3.4b and 3.5d). 
When analysed in azimuths we see a general decrease in density along all azimuths though at 
some point along all but the E and ENE azimuths, an increase in density is observed. For 
example, in the S azimuth, density decreases from 72.25 x10-2/m2 at 400 m from the crater mid-
point to 16.5 x10-2/m2 at 500 m distance. Density then increases to 32.75 x10-2/m2 at 600 m 
from mid-point and then decreases again with distance. Similar to the two-month distribution, 
ballistic deposition is greater towards the S-SSE and E-ESE in contrast to the SE at most 
distances except at 400 m from mid-point where it is at similar densities to the S and SSE 
(Figure 3.4b).  
 
Analysing the size distribution at varying distances and azimuths from the crater shows higher 
median ballistic diameters to the SE at 200, 300 and 500 m from crater mid-point that decrease 
away towards the ESE and SSE (Figure 3.5b). At 400 m from the crater mid-point, the ENE 
has the largest median diameter that decreases towards the E and NE, potentially indicating two 
lobes towards the SE and ENE (Figure 3.5b). The October distribution shows a general decrease 
of median ballistic size with distance from crater mid-point until 600 m where ballistic size 
begins to increase (Figure 3.5c). Increasing diameters following a general decreasing trend is 
also seen in the SSE, SE and ESE azimuths (Figure 3.5b). 
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between median ballistic size and spatial density with distance and direction from 
crater mid-point from the two-month (A) and October (B) distributions. C and D show the median diameter 
and mean spatial density with distance from crater mid-point for both distributions, irrespective of azimuth 
(with standard deviation error bars). 
3.4.2. Eruption dynamics 
Over 10 hours (between 30 July and 1 August) of GoPro footage was collected, capturing 758 
explosions. On average, 68 explosions occurred per hour, with 42/hr from South Crater and 
27/hour from North Crater. Each explosion was classified small, moderate or large, the vent 
origin noted (Table 3.1), and what style of eruption it was. As described earlier, the larger the 
explosion, the higher the ballistics are ejected. Subsequently, a larger explosion has the ability 
to eject ballistics further from the vent area. Styles included ballistic, ballistic with a tephra 
plume, tephra plume, and gas. A marked increase in the proportion of large events is noted on 
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the 1 August (52%) compared to the previous days (12% on the 30 July and 18% on the 31 
July). Additionally, an increase in the number of explosions from the south crater vs the 
northern crater was noted. The proportion increased from 52% (30 July) and 53% (31 July) to 
80% on the 1 August. Seismic and infrasound data over this time also show an increase in 
explosivity (Figure 3.6). This can be more clearly seen in the infrasound record (Figure 3.6A 
and B) where on day 5 (1 August) there is a noticeable increase in peak event and total 
amplitude. Highlighted in blue in Figure 3.6A are the video observed explosions from Table 
3.1. On average small explosions produce a peak pressure of 6.71 Pa, increasing to 13.6 Pa for 
moderate explosions and 27.7 Pa for large explosions. Eruptive activity therefore is not steady 
and can fluctuate over hours. 
 
Table 3.1: Number and proportion of small, moderate and large events, and the proportion of explosions 
from each crater recorded on GoPros between 30 July and 1 August. Peak pressure recorded on 
infrasound station YIB22 was found for each video recorded explosion and the average and standard 
deviation of all explosions categorised into small, moderate or large was calculated 
 
  30/07/2016 31/07/2016 1/08/2016 Peak pressure (Pa) at YIB22 
  No. % No. % No. % Average SD 
Small 153 55 223 49 2 8 6.71 7.28 
Moderate 90 33 146 32 10 40 13.6 14.6 
Large 32 12 83 19 13 52 27.7 20.6 
  
      
  
North 131 48 212 47 5 20   
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Figure 3.6: Infrasound and seismic amplitude metrics from a temporary co-located infrasound station 
(YIB22) and broadband seismometer (YS01) approximately 700 m from the summit vents. A shows peak 
event amplitudes for unfiltered infrasound data at YIB22. Blue symbols in A show infrasound amplitudes 
at YIB22 corresponding to the explosions analysed in video data in this study (see Table 1). Vertical dashed 
lines represent times of network completion for coincident triggers. B shows 10-minute Real-Time 
Infrasonic Amplitude (RIAM) and C shows Real-Time Seismic Amplitude (RSAM) values at YIB22 and 
YS01, respectively. 
 
From our analysis of the GoPro footage over 30 July to 1 August period, most explosions were 
vertically directed (40%). However, when the jet was angled, a SE directionality was the 
favoured direction from South Crater and S from North Crater (Figure 3.7). Between the two 
trips from 5 September to the 16 October, observations were made daily for 1 hour a day of 
where bombs were landing (rather than orientation of the jet as for the GoPro footage), 
indicating directionality favouring the south. Figure 3.7c shows the azimuths where bombs 
ejected from South Crater landed, with 39% landing to the south. Only two observations were 
made of bomb directionality from North Crater. On both occasions they were directed to the 
south. During the second trip from 16 – 20 October, general visual observations of eruption 
dynamics showed directionality to the south and east from South Crater and to the east from 
North Crater (Gomez and Kennedy 2017). 
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Figure 3.7: Directionality of explosion pulses. A and B show the percentages of individual explosions that 
are directed in varying directions from North Crater (A) and South Crater (B) recorded on the GoPros 
over three days. C shows the directionality from South Crater seen from the observational logs from 5 
September – 20 October 2016 
 
 
We also noted a changing directionality throughout individual eruption events on some 
occasions. For example, ballistics would be ejected toward the north at the start of the explosion 
and subsequently move towards the south in a spraying motion. This was also noted by Gaudin 
et al. (2014) in Strombolian explosions, where the mean ejection angle shifted up to 40° in a 
single explosion. They theorise that this is due to the changing location of the bubble rupture 
point as the rupture area continues to open and increase in size. These instances have not been 
included in the directionality data presented here for simplicity, however, it is important to 
recognise that directionality is not fixed and can change even during one eruption event. 
 
Not all explosions at Yasur have a ballistic component, with 18% of the explosions recorded 
on the GoPro videos having no observable ballistic component at all. This is an important 
consideration when using eruption frequency to assess ballistic hazard. 
 
Summarising our key results, we find that spatial density of ballistics decreases with distance 
from the crater, with this occurring more sharply in the two-month distribution than the October 
distribution, and that median ballistic diameter decreases with distance from crater. 
Directionality is evident in the spatial density mapping (S-SSE with a minor increase in density 
to the E), ballistic size distribution analysis (SE and minor ENE) and video analysis (SE from 
South Crater and S from North Crater) and the daily visual observations, though they do not all 
agree. Video footage showed an increase in the proportion of large explosions from the 30 July 
to the 1 August, with large explosions capable of ejecting ballistics above the crater rim and 
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creating a hazard for visitors. This is also seen in the infrasound and seismic record where 
amplitude increased on the 1 August. 
3.5. Discussion 
The ballistic distributions mapped from the aerial photos are the products of both the North and 
South Craters. The frequency of explosions from both craters, the lack of temporal sampling 
and the varying explosion directionalities make it difficult to assign specific vents to a 
distribution. However, it is likely that the higher densities in the S-SSE come from South Crater 
and those in the E from the North Crater. This deduction is based on the dominant explosion 
directionalities observed from video records and the observational logs and the greater distance 
ballistics from North Crater need to travel when directed toward the S-SSE. 
3.5.1. Decreasing median ballistic size with distance from the crater 
The relationship between ballistic size and distance travelled from source has been discussed 
in the literature with both increasing and decreasing size with distance observed. Taddeucci et 
al. (2017) summarise this literature to say that an increase in ballistic size with distance is 
observed in many ash and block rich Vulcanian eruptions (Minakami et al. 1969; Steinberg 
1974, 1976; Self et al. 1980; Druitt et al. 2002; Fitzgerald et al. 2014) and a decrease in size 
with distance is usually observed in phreatomagmatic eruptions (Lorenz 1970; Self et al. 1980; 
Waitt et al. 1995; De Novellis and Luongo 2006). The former is hypothesised to be because all 
ballistics exit the vent at similar velocities and due to inertia, larger ballistics travel further 
while smaller ballistics are more greatly affected by drag and land closer to the vent (Fagents 
and Wilson 1993; De Novellis and Luongo 2006; Bertin 2017; Taddeucci et al. 2017). For the 
latter, ballistics ejected in a gas stream may decrease the effects of drag on particles allowing 
smaller ones to travel higher than larger ones before dropping out of the stream and therefore 
travelling further than their larger counterparts (Lorenz, 1970; Self et al. 1980; De Novellis and 
Luongo 2006; Taddeucci et al. 2017; Kilgour et al. 2019). For clarity, we term the increase in 
ballistic size with distance as a normal distribution, and a decrease in ballistic size with distance, 
a reverse distribution. Ballistic fields can also show no evident size trend (Mastin 1991; 
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Taddeucci et al. 2017). Taddeucci et al. (2017) attribute this to three reasons: not all ballistics 
are ejected with the same velocity in an eruption; overlapping ballistics distributions either from 
multiple eruptions or multiple vents; and ballistic collisions. 
 
However, ballistic size-distance relationships have not been discussed in relation to 
Strombolian eruptions. As Strombolian explosions tend to be frequent (up to 9/hour at 
Stromboli (Harris and Ripepe 2007)) and typically deposit bombs closer to the vent, the risk of 
being impacted while conducting fieldwork is high and is likely the main reason the size-
distance relationship has not been investigated. A literature search resulted in two references 
where a relationship was found. Gurioli et al. (2013) note that in the 21 January 2010 eruption 
at Stromboli, thermal video shows ‘a leading spray of smaller bombs, quickly followed by an 
emission of larger bombs that attained lower heights and fell closer to the vent than those of the 
first spray’. Andronico and Pistolesi (2010) report pumiceous clast sizes between 7 and 20 cm 
in the summit area of Stromboli (~790 m.a.s.l.) that reduce to an average long axis of the five 
largest clasts of 11 cm at 650 m.a.s.l. from the 24th November 2009 eruption. Both papers show 
a reverse distribution. Bombrun et al. (2015) also recorded lower initial ejection velocities of 
larger projectiles compared to smaller projectiles at Stromboli volcano. Similar to the 
phreatomagmatic eruptions, Strombolian eruptions are driven by gas slugs, providing the gas 
stream needed to reduce drag on smaller projectiles (Harris et al. 2012; Taddeucci et al. 2015). 
This is likely the reason for the reverse distribution described in this paper and seen in the 
aforementioned publications.  
3.5.2. Changing spatial density with direction around the crater 
We see a change in spatial density from the south to the east, with higher densities in the S-SSE 
and ESE-E than the SE. Three main factors might influence where ballistics cluster or appear 
to cluster: (1) topography (Kilgour et al. 2019), (2) preservation of the deposit and (3) eruption 
directionality (Kilgour et al. 2010; Gurioli et al., 2013). A topographic high or steep sided crater 
wall may block ballistic deposition as ballistics may not be able to reach heights capable of 
landing on the other side of the topography or angled ballistics may get blocked by steep sided 
crater walls. There does not appear to be any topographic shadowing affecting ballistic 
deposition in the SE from South Crater or North Crater. The height of the crater rim is the same 
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in the SE as the ESE (~320m), though is 10 m and 35 m higher in the SSE and S respectively 
when measured from the crater mid-point. Therefore, if the SE were shadowed we should see 
similar densities to the SE in the ESE and lower densities in the SSE and S. Analysing the 
ability of ballistics to be ejected from the vents uninhibited by crater walls reveals that ballistics 
ejected at angles ≥34° from horizontal could escape the crater from the ESE to the SSE (Figure 
3.8). The angles were measured from the middle of the North and South Craters respectively, 
rather than the all-encompassing crater mid-point to be as accurate as possible. In Strombolian 
explosions ejection angles are typically close to vertical (within 5° from vertical at Stromboli – 
Chouet et al. 1974; around 72° at Mt Etna - Gouhier and Donnadieu 2011; 70-85° at Stromboli 
- Pistolesi et al. 2008) with 80 – 90% of particles ejected within 20° of the ejection axis (Chouet 
et al. 1974; Gouhier and Donnadieu 2010). If we use the lower end of the reported average 
ejection angles (72°) and add on 20° for the dispersion cone, all ballistics would successfully 
clear the ESE – SSE crater walls. 
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Figure 3.8 Topographic profiles of the crater rim and walls measured from the centre points of North Crater 
(NC) and South Crater (SC) along azimuths illustrated on the map, created from combining DEMs from 
the two trips. The red hatched line indicates 34°, the minimum angle that ballistics would clear the crater 
walls. 
 
Topography may also impact the preservation of the original spatial density (landing positions). 
We see a lower spatial density in the SE at 300 m from the crater mid-point compared to the 
same distance in the ESE and SSE (Figure 3.4b). This area is on the lee side of the crater rim 
dipping toward the vents (Figure 3.9). Landing on the lee side might explain lower densities in 
the SE at 300 m as the ballistics might land and then either roll back into crater or stop on lower 
part of the inner crater rim. None of the other mapping squares at a 300 m distance are on a lee 
slope towards the crater – the others either at the base of the inner rim or on the crater rim where 
it is flatter. We see three examples of empty impact craters with similar sized ballistics downhill 
(toward the crater) in the mapping square, as well as multiple cases of ballistics being on the 
crater edge of their impact craters (Figure 3.9). 
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Figure 3.9: Slope angles of the areas mapped 300 m from crater mid-point, highlighting the location of a 
mapping square on the lee side of the crater dipping towards the vents. Ballistics in the mapping square 
have bounced out of their craters (red circles show the crater and the likely ballistic) or have slumped to 
the edge of their crater closest to the vent (blue circles) 
 
The deposition of tephra fall has the ability to impede preservation of the ballistic field and can 
affect the estimations of hazard and risk. Yasur not only erupts ballistics but also tephra fall 
(ash and lapilli). We see a complete burial of the ballistics in the July images and deposition of 
new ballistics by the two-month distribution in the SE 200 m from the crater mid-point. Tephra 
deposition could also contribute to the lower spatial densities seen in the SE where windblown 
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tephra fall may have been deposited. To assess this possibility, we looked at the number of 
ballistics that were mapped in the July images but were no longer visible in the October images 
(Figure 3.10) and the wind directionality over the mapping period. Of the ballistics mapped in 
the July orthophotos, 50% were not visible in the October orthophotos. When divided into 
distance and azimuth from vent area, it is apparent that the SE does not have an increased 
percentage of missing ballistics compared to other azimuths and so rejects the hypothesis of SE 
ash and lapilli tephra fall directionality or preservation issues. Additionally, the prevailing wind 
direction for Tanna is from the E to SE which deposits tephra fall in the opposite direction to 
the W to NW. The anemometer deployed on the south rim of the crater recorded N-SE winds 
throughout the July/August trip, though predominantly E-SE (see Jolly et al. 2017), that again 
would not be responsible for depositing tephra fall preferentially to the SE. However, deposition 
of tephra fall in proximal areas of the cone is still likely, especially when wind speeds are low 
and this along with ballistic deposition would explain the 50% of ballistics that could not be 




Figure 3.10: Number and percentage of ballistics missing from the October images that were mapped in the 
July/August images out of the total mapped from the July/August images. Five sites were excluded (500 – 
700 m in the south azimuth and 400 m in the ESE and E) as photo resolution inhibited determining whether 
tephra fall did cover previously mapped areas. 
 
Directed eruptions can produce asymmetric ballistic fields (Kilgour et al. 2010; Houghton et al. 
2011; Gurioli et al. 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014). We observed from the video footage a 
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predominantly SE directionality from South Crater and a predominantly S directionality from 
North Crater. From the observational logs taken over the two-month period, more bombs were 
reported landing to the south of the vents in South Crater (i.e. both on the southern crater wall 
and outside the crater rim to the south). The longer observations of directionality over two 
months from the observational logs and those from the North Crater would explain the increased 
spatial density in the S and SSE in the mapped distribution. However, the dominant SE 
directionality from South Crater recorded on video during the July/August fieldwork is not 
supported in the mapped distributions (we would see an increased spatial density in the SE). 
This could be due to the short timeframe of recorded video (3 days) not representing the longer-
term directionality. The E-ESE increase in spatial density seen in the mapped distribution can 
also be explained by explosion directionality, with 27% of the directed explosions recorded on 
video from North Crater going to the east. Higher spatial density in the SSE and E are also 
noted in maps produced following increased activity in 1994 (Global Volcanism Program 
1995). Salvatore et al. (2018) recorded variations in jet directionality over short timescales of 
hours to days at Stromboli from a four-year record and that this was the result of changes to 
vent size and morphology. Over longer timescales (months to years) vents were observed to 
migrate and merge. Both of these factors could cause the asymmetry seen in our mapping. 
 
In summary, ballistic spatial density changes with direction from the crater. This is caused by 
explosion directionality and minimally by slope changes. Topographic shadowing was not 
observed from the NE to S (though may affect the unmapped western side which is higher than 
the east and south), and tephra fall and ballistic burial of the ballistic field does not explain the 
observed changes in spatial density with direction but does explain the lack of preservation of 
many ballistics. 
 
3.5.3. Contrasting size, density and directionality data 
A larger median ballistic diameter is observed at each of 200, 300 and 500 m distance in the SE 
compared to other azimuths. In the SE azimuth, we also observe the lowest ballistic spatial 
density and highest proportion of explosion directionality from the GoPro videos. The 
contradicting GoPro explosion directionality and spatial density, as explained earlier, is due to 
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the GoPro footage representing a small timeframe and not the longer-term preferential 
directionality. However, this does not explain the large clast size anomaly in the SE. We suggest 
this is the result of larger less frequent eruptions ejecting larger ballistics further and wider, 
depositing large clasts in the SE as well as in all other directions. The more common smaller 
explosions are directed in other directions, depositing smaller ballistics in these areas (with 
larger ballistics landing closer to the vents) and decreasing the median clast size of the azimuths. 
Figure 3.11 supports this idea, showing fewer ballistics 10-20 cm in size in the SE than the 
other azimuths in both distributions. In the October distribution (Figure 3.11b) we also observe 
fewer 20-40 cm size ballistics in the SE than other azimuths. From 50 cm+ similar numbers of 
ballistics are seen in all azimuths. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Size distribution of ballistics in each azimuth between 300 and 500 m from the crater mid-
point. A: Two-month distribution. B: October distribution 
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3.5.4. Differences in the density with distance trend between the two-month 
and October distributions 
A decrease in the ballistic spatial density with increasing distance from the vent area is evident 
in both the two-month and October distributions, though they do not follow the same trend. A 
steeper decrease is seen in the two-month distribution. The October distribution covers a longer 
time period where larger eruptions likely occurred over months to years prior to the survey date, 
ejecting a greater number of ballistics further than in the two-month period.  
3.6. Hazard/risk implications 
Our results have implications for risk management. Understanding which areas have higher 
densities of ballistic impact and how the spatial density decreases with distance can be used to 
determine where transient visitors may be safer to visit or where infrastructure is sited.  
 
The spatial density of ballistics reported here should be considered conservative due to burial 
of proximal deposits by subsequent tephra fall, masking the true deposition; hence the hazard 
to visitors may be underestimated. Preservation issues with ballistic deposits (e.g. burial of 
deposits as witnessed here, but also erosion of craters by weather and other factors) show how 
time sensitive ballistic mapping is to capture the true distribution from an eruption. 
 
This ballistic hazard research does not encompass the hazard from larger eruptions which would 
likely produce a larger ballistic field that may extend into the jungle at Yasur. Reports from a 
more explosive eruption period in June-July 1999 describe ejected ballistics reaching as far as 
600 m from the nearest edge of the crater (Global Volcanism Program 1999). This would 
require fieldwork at greater distances from the crater and modelling to understand the potential 
distributions. Further assessment would also be beneficial over a longer time period (e.g. 12-24 
months), like that performed by Salvatore et al. (2018), to capture any temporal variability in 
eruption directionality and potentially eruption size, which may reduce the spatial variability 
seen in this study. We note the Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), the 
government agency responsible for disaster risk reduction, have a permanent exclusion zone 
that includes the crater and the top of the flanks extending around from the viewing points. 
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Additional ‘zones’ are restricted during periods of elevated seismic activity (monitored by 
Vanuatu Meteorology and Geohazards Department (VMGD)) associated with larger or more 
frequent explosions (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.6 show the correlation between elevated seismo-
acoustic activity and an observed increase in the proportion of larger explosions).  Danger Zone 
A includes the cone and volcano viewing is only allowed from the carpark. Danger Zone B is 
an ~500 m radius from the edge of the crater rim that includes the car park and parts of the ash 
plain (Vanuatu Meteorology and Geohazards Department 2019). As shown in Figure 3.6 and 
Table 3.1, acoustic sensors are highly complementary to the seismic and visual observations 
with regards to energy dynamics of eruptions and ballistic hazard. Acoustic monitoring at the 
sole seismic station monitored by VMGD may add value to monitoring and risk decision 
making, though further investigation of its limitations is needed which is outside the scope of 
this study. 
  
As well-known with volcanoes, past behaviour does not necessarily dictate future behaviour. 
This needs to be considered when using eruption directionality to assess potential ballistic 
hazard areas (i.e. areas exposed to volcanic ballistic deposition), which could then be used to 
inform where access on the volcano may be tolerable within risk management decision making. 
Our data shows that the ballistic hazard is highly spatially variable, in part due to explosion 
directionality, but that directionality may vary significantly temporally. Therefore directionality 
results from this study alone should not be used as the basis for hazard and risk decisions. 
Longitudinal studies on directionality patterns are needed to determine the stability, usefulness 
and representativeness of directionality in ballistic hazard and risk decision-making. It may be 
more pragmatic to use spatial density and how this changes with distance from the vent to 
describe the hazard intensity and for a radius of a certain distance around the vent based on 
spatial density to be used to define ‘hazard areas’ so that any future change in directionality 
is accounted for. In the past hazard areas have been defined by the maximum travel distance of 
a specific diameter ballistic. However, as discussed earlier, eruptions can produce normal and 
reverse ballistic distributions and thus setting a high or low diameter threshold could mean over 
or underestimating travel distance depending on the eruption style. Combining these two 
approaches where spatial density of ballistic deposition above a dangerous diameter is used as 
a measure to define hazard areas could also be considered in the future. Further investigation is 
needed to determine what measure is best to apply to characterise ballistic hazard. 
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The ballistic hazard mapping and analysis presented in this paper is intended to improve our 
understanding of the extent and distribution of ballistic hazard from Strombolian eruptions.  
This study should not be used in isolation to guide or inform risk management decisions at 
Yasur or any other volcano necessarily.  Rather this study provides data and analysis for one 
step (of many) in the process of assessing risk to visitors and infrastructure, which can 
contribute to informing decisions as to how the risk should be managed. 
3.7. Conclusions 
Understanding where ballistics land, their spatial density and size, and how this changes with 
distance and direction from the vent can inform more effective risk management. This is 
especially important on volcanoes that are frequently visited such as Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu. 
We used a drone to image part of the ballistic field around Yasur and GoPro cameras and daily 
observations to record explosions. Mapping and analysis of the images and video taken 
revealed: 
 
1) The spatial density of the ballistics decreased with increasing distance away from the 
crater 
2) The median ballistic diameter decreased with distance from the crater, similar to that 
seen from Strombolian eruption deposits at Stromboli and also from phreatomagmatic 
eruptions around the world. This is likely due to the presence of a gas jet decreasing 
drag on particles, allowing smaller ones to travel higher and further than larger ones. 
3) Higher spatial densities of ballistics are seen in the S-SSE than in other directions. We 
attribute this to directionality and angularity in the blasts and not to topographic 
shadowing. 
4) A different directionality was observed in the GoPro videos than in the daily 
observations and ballistics mapped from aerial photos. The mapping represents a longer 
time frame than the observations or videos and likely represents the longer-term 
directionality trend. 
5) Field preservation issues are apparent, with the burial of ballistics by further deposition 
of tephra fall. Therefore, ballistic mapping is time sensitive after an eruption and delays 
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in mapping will likely be accompanied by decrease in field preservation and result in 
an underestimation of ballistic hazard. 
 
When creating ballistic hazard and risk maps or making risk management decisions at 
continuously erupting volcanoes it is important to remember that the hazard can vary over 
relatively small areas and over different time frames. Assessing the hazard over as much of the 
volcano as possible and over as long a time frame as possible will produce more effective results 
to subsequently base successful risk management decisions from. 
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Preamble (Chapter 4) 
Chapter 3 described the spatial and temporal distribution of ballistics from Yasur Volcano, 
Vanuatu. Chapter 4 builds on Chapters 2 and 3 by investigating the hazard footprint from an 
individual ballistic and the hazard intensity within this area. Understanding the hazard intensity 
within the ballistic field and also within the individual ballistic hazard footprint allows for more 
precise assessment of exposure and vulnerability, and thus more effective risk management 
decisions. Findings from this chapter suggest that ballistic size, crater size, ejecta apron size, 
impact angle, ballistic kinetic energy, ballistic density and surface hardness can all influence 
the size of the individual ballistic hazard footprint. A pneumatic cannon is used to assess the 
kinetic energy (the hazard intensity metric) and travel distance from ejecta produced on impact 
from ballistics of different densities fired at different strength surfaces.  
 
Chapter 4 is to be submitted to the Journal of Applied Volcanology. 
 
Conceptual diagram showing the objectives of the thesis with the objectives addressed in 




Chapter Four – Using pneumatic cannon experiments to understand ballistic hazard footprints 
 
Page | 100  
 
Chapter Four – Using pneumatic cannon experiments to 
understand ballistic hazard footprints 
4.1. Abstract 
Ballistic projectiles from explosive volcanic eruptions can have sufficient kinetic energy to 
cause injury or death to exposed people. An increasing number of visitors to volcanoes and an 
increasing global population means increased exposure to volcanic hazards. This has driven the 
need for a more complete understanding of volcanic ballistic phenomena, the hazard they pose, 
human vulnerability, and risk management strategies. Previous volcanic ballistic research has 
focused predominantly on spatial distribution, formation and transport mechanisms, 
complemented by records of the injuries that ballistics can inflict.  But an important knowledge 
gap is the hazard footprint from an individual ballistic impact – what aspects contribute to it 
and its size, and the quantification of injury severity with respect to ballistic kinetic energy.  In 
this study we review the variables that influence the hazard footprint and the literature on kinetic 
energy thresholds for injury and death from this and other hazards. We then focus on the 
contribution of impact ejecta on the hazard footprint using a pneumatic cannon to fire volcanic 
rocks towards a range of substrates and recording the tests with a high-speed camera. We found 
that ballistic impacts can produce ejecta with enough kinetic energy to injure, implying hazard 
footprint estimates should be substantially larger than ballistic diameter. More porous ballistics 
(1.43 and 2.13 g/cm3) were more likely to produce ejecta from fragmentation than higher 
density ballistics (2.89 g/cm3) and harder, more cohesive substrates produced higher kinetic 
energy/velocity ejecta than looser substrates. From the injury data we propose energy thresholds 
for minor and serious injury and death. The thresholds were then applied to two ejecta scenarios 
and each hazard footprint zoned by damage state to understand how the hazard intensity and 
injury severity changed with distance from impact. Our experiments improve our understanding 
of the hazard to people on volcanoes from ballistics and provide important data to inform risk 
assessments and mitigation measures in areas exposed to ballistic hazard. 
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4.2. Introduction 
Ballistics, fragments of molten lava or solid rock ejected from explosive volcanic eruptions, 
can travel up to hundreds of metres per second and range between centimetres to tens of metres 
in diameter. They can have sufficient kinetic energy to cause injury or death to exposed people 
(e.g. Baxter and Gresham 1997; Shiroko 2016). Increasing visitor numbers to volcanoes, recent 
fatal ballistic incidents, and an increasing global need for disaster risk reduction is driving the 
need for a more complete understanding of the spatial and temporal distribution and intensity 
of ballistic hazard, what societal elements (e.g. people) may be exposed to the hazard, and how 
vulnerable those elements are to the hazard to enable more robust assessment of risk (Fitzgerald 
et al. 2017).  
 
Research has been focused on improving understanding of extent and frequency of ballistic 
hazard (e.g. Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012, 2016; Gurioli et al. 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 
2019). However, little work has been undertaken on the individual ballistic hazard footprint, 
consequences from ballistics and how this is linked to hazard intensity (e.g. kinetic energy of 
the ballistic). Field observations have shown that factors that can influence the hazard footprint 
include volcano slope, substrate hardness, and ejecta from the substrate or ballistic (Pistolesi et 
al. 2008; Maeno et al. 2013; Taddeucci et al. 2017). For example, a ballistic impacting a hard 
surface may break, ejecting shrapnel metres away, therefore increasing the area affected by 
hazard. Whereas an impact onto a softer surface may not cause the ballistic to break and as such 
the hazard footprint would be smaller as there is no shrapnel produced (Rosi et al. 2006; 
Pistolesi et al. 2008; Taddeucci et al. 2017). A number of studies have considerably improved 
our understanding of building vulnerability to ballistics (Blong 1984; Pomonis et al. 1999; 
Jenkins et al. 2014; Biass et al. 2016; Williams et al. 2017/Appendix D), yet there is a lack of 
equivalent attention to human vulnerability. Three studies have included human vulnerability 
in their ballistic assessments (Jolly et al. 2014; Deligne et al. 2018; Fitzgerald et al. 2014), but 
only consider block size, crater size and impact angle as factors that can influence the hazard 
footprint (the area the hazard affects), and do not link the intensity of the hazard to the intensity 
of the consequence.  Rather they take a simple precautionary approach assuming only direct 
interaction with the ballistic and crater, and that any interaction will cause casualty (therefore 
considered a binary hazard). These assumptions are made with no investigation into the 
intensity of the hazard (kinetic energies of the ballistic and ejecta) at which these might occur. 
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Improved understanding of the hazard footprint, hazard intensity within the footprint, and injury 
severity will allow for more accurate vulnerability and risk assessments to be completed and 
more effective risk management strategies applied. 
 
We present an overview of the factors that may influence the ballistic hazard footprint and the 
range of injuries that can occur. We use experimental data and a trajectory model to investigate 
the impact energies and travel distances of ballistic impact ejecta and their contributions to the 
hazard footprint. Using the collected injury data, we create damage states, hazard intensity 
metrics and fragility functions, and apply these to our experimental data to understand how 
hazard intensity and injury severity changes with distance.  
4.2.1. Hazard footprint 
One of the fundamental elements of natural hazard risk assessment is defining the spatial (and 
often temporal) domain that will be affected by the hazard (Smith 2013) – the hazard footprint. 
When a measure of hazard intensity (HIM) (e.g. thickness of tephra fall, density of ballistics, 
etc) is distributed across the hazard footprint then the potential consequences of the hazard may 
be analysed when combined with exposed elements and their associated vulnerability 
characteristics.   
 
Jolly et al. (2014) estimated a hazard footprint that assumes fatality of 7m2 per ballistic impact 
from the August 2012 eruption of Upper Te Maari, Tongariro, New Zealand. This was based 
on the diameter of a person, the size of the ballistic, and a direct impact from vertical. Deligne 
et al. (2018) took a similar approach, though included an option for a side impact (a lower 
impact angle) in VoLREst (used by GNS Science to assess life safety for staff conducting 
fieldwork on active volcanoes). Instead of fatality, Fitzgerald et al. (2014) estimated the 
likelihood of casualty (injury or death) from the 2012 eruptions of Upper Te Maari, Tongariro 
and two eruption scenarios. They used the crater diameter and the block diameter, the diameter 
of a person and the impact angle/flight path in their hazard footprint and vulnerability 
calculations. They also placed the person outside of the crater in their model to allow for 
vulnerability to ejecta. However, a number of factors have been identified as potentially 
influencing the risk to humans from ballistic hazards, including: ballistic kinetic energy (a 
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function of ballistic mass and velocity), ballistic size, crater size, ejecta apron size, ejecta 
velocity, impact angle, slope, substrate hardness, and ballistic lithology/density (Figure 4.1). In 
the following sections we review relationships found in the literature for each variable to help 
refine models for estimating ballistic hazard footprint.  
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Figure 4.1 Ballistic hazard footprint size is influenced by many factors. A) Ballistic size, B) Crater size, C) 
Impact angle, D) Slope, E) Ballistic density/lithology, F) Substrate hardness. Initials: P= person, C= 
crater, B= ballistic, EA= ejecta apron 
 
4.2.1.1. Kinetic energy of the ballistic 
The ballistic itself is the main hazard, capable of killing or injuring a person by direct impact 
(Baxter and Gresham 1997; Shiroko 2016) depending on the kinetic energy of the ballistic. A 
faster and larger/heavier ballistic will do more damage than a slower and smaller/lighter 
ballistic. Ballistics can range in size from several centimetres to tens of metres in diameter 
(Table 4.1). Jolly et al. (2014) and Deligne et al. (2018) use ballistic size in their vulnerability 
calculations, applying values of 1 m and 20 cm respectively. The amount of kinetic energy also 
influences whether a crater is formed and its size (Dufresne et al. 2013), as well as the size and 
velocity of impact crater ejecta (Hartmann 1985). Kinetic energy (KE) is the product of the 









Many studies report measured or modelled initial ballistic velocities (Minakami 1942; Gouhier 
and Donnadieu 2011; Harris et al. 2012; Taddeucci et al. 2012) but very few state impact 
velocities. Using trajectory modelling Maeno et al. (2013) found impact velocities of 120 – 160 
m/s for two large blocks 1 – 3 tonnes in size. Taddeucci et al. (2017) reported impact velocities 
of 10 – 30 m/s with kinetic energies of 102 – 105 J. Tsunematsu et al. (2016) model the ballistics 
ejected in the 2014 eruption of Mt Ontake, Japan. They found mean impact velocities of 83 – 
85 m/s and mean landing energies of 104 J. 
 
Table 4.1 Measurements of ballistic diameters from various eruptions and volcanoes around the world 
 
Ballistic diameter Volcano Reference 
Average of three axes 0.2-0.6m Popocatepetl, Mexico Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 
2012 
Average of three axes 0.12-
0.26m 
El Chichon, Mexico Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. 
2016 
0.15 – 0.20 m Mt Etna, Italy Andronico et al. 2015 
0.07 – 4.59 m Stromboli, Italy Gurioli et al. 2013 
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0.08 – 2 m  Mt Spurr, USA Waitt et al. 1992 
0.2 – 20 m  Tokachidake, Japan Yamagishi and Feebrey 1994 
Maximum 20 m Ngauruhoe, New Zealand Nairn and Self 1978 
Median 0.1 – 0.3 m. Largest 1m Mt Etna McGetchin et al. 1974 
0.05 – 3.04 m Yasur, Vanuatu Chapter 3 
0.25 – 2.01 m Kilauea, USA Swanson et al. 2012 
0.1 – 1 m Mt Ontake, Japan Kaneko et al. 2016 
2 – 25 m Ukinrek Maars, USA Self et al. 1980 
0.1 – 1 m Stromboli, Italy Pistolesi et al. 2008 
4.2.1.2. Ballistic size, crater size and the relationship between the two 
Ballistic size affects the width of the flight path (trajectory prior to impact that poses a hazard 
to a person) (Figure 4.1A). In this way, a larger diameter ballistic creates a larger area where a 
person could be impacted, as well as a larger proportion of the person’s body which could be 
impacted, likely causing greater injury than a smaller ballistic.  
 
Ballistic size also has a considerable influence on crater size. For any given impact velocity, a 
larger size ballistic will generally have more mass and thus impact with more kinetic energy 
creating a larger crater (Figure 4.1B). Field measurements of ballistic craters range from tens 
of centimetres to tens of metres in size. Kaneko et al. (2016) and Swanson et al. (2012) reported 
craters of tens of centimetres to 1 m at Mt Ontake and 3 – 4 m at Kilauea, respectively. On the 
larger end, Fudali and Melson (1972) measured craters up to 30 m in diameter at Arenal 
Volcano, Costa Rica and Self et al. (1980) measured craters up to 25 m at Ukinrek Maars. 
Fitzgerald et al. (2014) used an average crater size of 1.2 m at Upper Te Maari in their hazard 
footprint. 
 
On the occasion that only ballistic diameter or crater diameter is known, it may be possible to 
use a scaling relationship to calculate the unknown variable to use in hazard and vulnerability 
calculations. Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al. (2012) found that impact craters at Popocatepetl 
were on average 4 – 5 times the diameter of the corresponding ballistics. This relationship was 
found to be greater (1:10) by Breard et al. (2014) at Upper Te Maari due to soft substrates. 
Experimental work by Uehara et al. (2003) concluded that crater diameter scales at ¼ power of 
the energy of the projectile at impact in loose granular substrates. 
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Despite creating a large physical change to the surface, it is unclear whether crater formation 
would harm a person within the cratering area (i.e. by shockwave). It may be that the ejecta is 
the hazard and therefore the ejecta apron size, not crater size, needs to be considered in the 
hazard footprint.  
4.2.1.3. Ejecta travel distance 
On impact with the ground, a ballistic may eject material either from fragmentation of the 
ballistic (shrapnel) or from excavation of the ground/crater formation (debris) (Figure 4.2). It 
is possible that material may be ejected with sufficient kinetic energy or thermal energy to cause 
injury or death. The distance that ejecta travels can therefore define the hazard footprint beyond 
the impact crater. Two to four rays of ejecta extending up to 5 m surrounded craters larger than 
3 m formed in the 1992 Mt Spurr eruption (Waitt et al. 1992). Ballistics with impact velocities 
of 10 – 30 m/s and kinetic energies of 102 – 105 J were found by Taddeucci et al. (2017) to 
fragment and travel in excess of 5 m from the impact. Following the 5 April 2003 eruption of 
Stromboli, Pistolesi et al. (2008) and Rosi et al. (2006) noted ballistic impacts ejected material 
up to tens of metres from the impact. Similar distances were recorded at Shinmoedake Volcano 
after the 2011 eruption. Maeno et al. (2013) found two impact craters 7 m in diameter that 
ejected soil debris and lava fragments up to 15 m and 28 m from the crater. Even greater 
distances were reached in the 1974-75 eruption of Ngauruhoe, New Zealand. Nairn and Self 
(1978) found many impact craters near walking tracks ~ 2 – 3 km from the crater were 
surrounded by rays of ejecta that reached up to 100 m from the crater.  
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Figure 4.2 Bomb impact at Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu that produced an impact crater and debris rays (darker 
material) 
 
Relationships between the size of the ejecta apron and crater size have been found by Fitzgerald 
et al. (2014) and Gault and Greeley (1978). Ejecta aprons measured following the August 2012 
Upper Te Maari eruption were on average 110% greater in diameter than the crater diameter 
(Fitzgerald et al. 2014). The mechanism has also been observed in planetary impact studies. 
Analysis of Martian impact craters by Gault and Greeley (1978) found ejecta deposits up to two 
crater diameters away from the crater rim. However, care must be taken when applying the 
planetary results to volcanic examples as they are hypervelocity impacts and occur in much 
lower gravity. The reports mentioned above illustrate that ejecta travel distance is an 
understudied but important dimension of a ballistic hazard footprint.  
4.2.1.4. Ejecta velocity 
The velocity at which material is ejected is also an important variable in the hazard footprint. 
If ejecta are not travelling fast enough to cause injury, then the entire travel distance does not 
need to be included in the footprint, e.g. ejecta may have fast enough velocity over the first 
metre but slow down past this distance so that the rest of its travel distance is not relevant in the 
footprint. Only studies on extra-terrestrial impacts could be found with ejecta velocities. 
Experiments in these publications were done in near-vacuum or vacuum conditions at very high 
speed. Hartmann (1985) describe increasing ejecta velocities with increasing impact energy and 
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crater size from near-vacuum experiments. Holsapple et al. (2002) reported on experiments of 
high-speed impacts onto rock targets and found that ejecta velocities were typically between 
0.1 and 0.5% of the impactor velocity. They also found that fine dust is usually the fastest ejecta 
produced near the impact, travelling an order of magnitude faster than larger ejecta. Results 
reported by Hartmann (1985) contradict this finding. In near-vacuum experiments finer powder 
targets ejected particles with lower velocities than coarser powder targets. Oberbeck (1975) and 
Braslau (1970) conclude that ejecta launched later in the cratering process is slower than ejecta 
launched earlier in the process. Braslau (1970) recorded ejecta velocities of ~4000 m/s in the 
early stages reducing to a few metres per second in the late stages of cratering. Air densities 
and velocities used in these experiments would likely influence the applicability of these results 
to a terrestrial volcano. 
4.2.1.5. Impact angle 
The impact angle of a ballistic can increase the hazard footprint, as illustrated in Figure 4.1C, 
because the flight path distance below the height of a person is longer with lower impact angles. 
It is therefore important to use the impact angle to calculate the length of this critical flight path. 
Fitzgerald et al. (2014) found the average impact angle of blocks from the August 2012 eruption 
of Upper Te Maari to be 59°. Similarly, Maeno et al. (2013) found impact angles of 50 - 60° 
from broken trees at two craters from the 2011 eruption of Shinmoedake; and Minakami (1942) 
reported 57 – 61° impact angles from the 16 April 1937 and 7 June 1938 eruptions at Asama.  
The impact angle can also change the size and shape of the crater and ejecta apron. 
Hypervelocity impacts with impact angles between 0 - 30° produced elongated craters in 
experiments performed by Gault and Wedekind (1978). At angles < 70°, Manga et al. (2012) 
reported projectiles did not remain in their impact crater in low velocity experiments, bouncing 
out and becoming hazardous again. Pierazzo and Melosh (2000) found that decreasing impact 
angles below 45° produced asymmetric ejecta aprons. Butterfly wing patterns of ejecta were 
also noted in very oblique impacts (< 5°) where ejecta is distributed perpendicular to the path 
of the projectile rather than up or down range. 
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4.2.1.6. Slope 
Similarly to the impact angle, the slope angle of the plane that the ballistic impacts can cause 
bouncing or rolling of the ballistic outside of its crater or original landing position (Figure 
4.1D). Bouncing, rolling and sliding post-impact has been observed on Tungurahua (Bernard 
2018), on the north-western slope of Ngauruhoe in 1948 eruption (Allen 1948/Hobden et al. 
2002), at Kilauea (Swanson et al. 2012), and at Stromboli, Etna, Fuego, Yasur, Batu Tara and 
Sakurajima (Taddeucci et al. 2017). Steinberg and Lorenz (1983) observed bouncing and 
landing outside impact craters on steep slopes > 15 - 20° at Alaid Volcano following the 1972 
eruption. Rolling was noted at Etna on slopes between 31° and 38° (McGetchin et al. 1974). 
Blocks ejected in the 5th April 2003 eruption of Stromboli slipped downslope for tens of metres 
when impacting soft soil or vegetation (Pistolesi et al. 2008). Rosi et al. (2006) report that a 
large block from the same eruption slid downslope and created an elongated 18 x 8 m crater. 
Gault and Wedekind (1978) concluded from hypervelocity experiments that a specific critical 
angle of impact for causing ricochet (bouncing) did not exist as it depended on multiple 
variables. Slope can also lower impact angles, increasing the flight path, as well as creating 
elongated craters and ejecta aprons, and subsequently changing the hazard footprint. Breard et 
al. (2014) concluded that slope had an important influence on crater elongation by decreasing 
or increasing the local impact angle of the ballistic to the surface, with 30% of craters on the 
stoss side of ridges at Upper Te Maari and 70% on the lee side elongated. Asymmetric aprons 
were also noted by Krohn et al. (2014) on an asteroid (Vesta). Ejected material was prevented 
from depositing uphill on slopes > 20°. 
4.2.1.7. Substrate effects on impacts 
Substrate strength can influence the size of the hazard footprint (Figure 4.1F). Impacts into 
harder substrates are more likely to result in fragmentation of the ballistic, producing shrapnel 
but less likely to create craters or produce debris. Rosi et al. (2006) and Taddeucci et al. (2017) 
have observed ballistics impacting hard substrates, such as lava flows, and shattering. While 
ballistics impacting soft substrates such as vegetation have been observed to stay intact 
(Andronico et al. 2015; Pistolesi et al. 2008). Manga et al. (2012) found water saturation of the 
substrate also influenced crater size and the amount of material ejected from the crater. Less 
material was ejected in experiments on water saturated sand and a shallower crater produced 
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compared to dry sand. Cintala et al. (1977) also found that substrate affected crater morphology 
and size, analysing extra-terrestrial impact craters. 
 
Impacts into harder substrates can also produce faster ejecta than that from softer substrates. 
Experiments performed by Michikami et al. (2001) found that as porosity increased in their 
targets, ejecta velocity decreased. They found that velocities were more than two magnitudes 
lower from glass bead targets of 60-80% than rock targets. 
4.2.1.8. Ballistic density/strength 
The density or lithology of the ballistic can change crater depth, as this reduces the relative 
mass and energy of the impactor. Shallower craters were recorded from lower density impactors 
in hypervelocity experiments by Dufresne et al. (2013). Additionally, lower density ballistics 
are more likely to shatter on impact than higher density ballistics (Figure 4.1E). Yamagishi and 
Feebrey (1994) observed that most vesiculated bombs broke on impact with the ground. Ductile 
bombs, which can continue to vesiculate during flight and are usually associated with low 
densities, have also been observed to tear and break on impact, producing ejecta (Kimura 2016; 
Taddeucci et al. 2017). 
4.2.2. Human vulnerability to ballistic hazards 
Contemporary risk-to-life ballistic risk assessments consider human vulnerability in a relatively 
simple manner as a binary hazard, with the lack of clear empirical evidence necessitating a 
precautionary approach (Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Jolly et al. 2014; Deligne et al. 2018). 
Specifically, none of the three approaches relate kinetic energy (hazard intensity) to the 
potential consequences to people. So as our understanding of ballistic phenomena and hazard 
assessment technique improve (as outlined above and in earlier components of the thesis), there 
is now a growing need to better constrain and consider vulnerability within risk assessment 
approaches. In particular, the knowledge gaps of insufficient (if any) human fragility to ballistic 
impacts and the potential hazard footprint of ballistics.  This necessitated a wider search for 
human vulnerability estimates from other similar hazards. Three risk assessments of landslides, 
rockfall and large clast fallout were found that included human vulnerability to projectile 
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hazards. Finlay et al. (1988) attribute a probability of 0.5 to a person being struck by rockfall 
and it causing death based on fatalities from landslides in Hong Kong. Massey et al. (2012) 
combine the probability given by Finlay et al. (1988) and research on the rockfalls generated in 
the 22 February 2011 ‘Christchurch’ earthquake in New Zealand to also use a probability of 
0.5 for a person being hit by rockfall causing death. Neither of these studies provided kinetic 
energy estimates, simply assuming any interaction with a ballistics will cause harm. In a risk 
assessment of the fallout of large clasts from an eruption at Mt Etna, Osman et al. (2019) 
modelled the kinetic energy of 5 cm clasts on impact. Energies ranged from 6 – 46 J and thus 
they defined this size of clast as hazardous, supported by a medical study that showed skull 
fracture could occur at approximately 28 J (Yoganandan et al. 1995). This was the only 
assessment that could be found that provided kinetic energy thresholds for consequences. 
 
Before we apply kinetic energy thresholds to consequences of ballistic impacts, we must 
explore the range of consequences that could and have occurred. Impact from ballistics have 
caused 367 fatalities globally and many more injuries, from a range of eruption sizes (VEI 1 – 
4) (Brown et al. 2017). They are the most common cause of fatality for both tourists and 
scientists on volcanoes (Brown et al. 2017). In-depth analysis of causes and types of injury from 
two incidents with fatalities and casualties have been conducted by Baxter and Gresham (1997) 
and Shiroko (2016). Five people were killed by ballistics in the 1993 eruption of Galeras, 
Colombia. Baxter and Gresham (1997) reported that most fatalities were due to impacts to the 
head causing destruction of the skull, exposure of the brain and brain injuries. However, spinal 
and internal rupture injuries from being thrown forward on impact, full thickness burns from 
contact with hot ballistics, and severing of the upper and lower body by a large ballistic were 
also noted. Survivors suffered from burns, fractures of the skull, leg and hand, sprains, 
concussion, contusions and lacerations. Shiroko (2016) reported ballistic injuries from three 
survivors of the 2014 Mt Ontake, Japan eruption. Injuries included fractures of the shoulder, 
ribs, upper arm and thumb, extensive contusions, and burns. The severity of bone destruction 
in one case is compared to that seen in gunshot victims or blast injuries seen in war.  
 
To assess whether and what aspects of ballistic impact could cause injury or death it is important 
to know the kinetic energy thresholds responsible for each. Two reports of contrasting outcomes 
highlight the importance of using kinetic energy as a hazard intensity metric rather than solely 
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size, mass or velocity. Fragments 9 cm in diameter caused no discomfort on impact in the 1973 
Eldjfell eruption, though fibreglass helmets and padded clothing were worn (Booth 1979). 
However, scoria fragments less than 8 cm in diameter caused severe scalp lacerations in the 
1974 eruption of Etna, and 5cm dense fragments from an eruption at Etna in 1971 penetrated a 
fibreglass helmet left outside overnight (Booth 1979).  
 
Studies of blunt force trauma and penetration wounds (e.g. gunshot) have based their evaluation 
of potential injury on this equation while others have used kinetic energy density which 
additionally considers the size of the impactor. Larger objects have a greater surface area to 
transfer energy which means that the kinetic energy from the impactor is spread over a larger 
area. Whereas a smaller impactor has less area to do this and thus the kinetic energy is more 













Where A is the impactor area, calculated using the diameter d of the impactor. Results are given 
as J/cm2. Others (Lyon et al. 1999; Sturdivan et al. 2004; Raymond et al. 2009; Radi 2013) have 
used the blunt criterion (BC) model which considers the ability of the body to tolerate/absorb 
the impact by including the target mass M and the thickness of the body wall of the target T: 
 
 









The BC model is typically plotted against the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) created by the 
American Association of Automotive Medicine to assess the relative severity of motor vehicle 
related injury (Petrucelli et al. 1981). It scales injury severity from minor (1) to maximum (6) 
and allocates a probability of fatality to each level. AIS 1 is a minor injury with a probability 
of death of 0%, AIS 6 is a maximum injury with a probability of 100%. Anything above AIS 3 
is considered life threatening (Radi 2013). 
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Baxter and Gresham (1997) report the threshold for fatality as 80 J. Radi (2013) estimate a 
similar value for skull fracture (76 J or 1.6 J/cm2) from a ≥30 cm impactor but attribute a 
probability of fatality to <10% (AIS 3). Skull fracture occurred at lower KE (28 J and 19.6 - 
63.8 J respectively) in biomechanical experiments performed by Yoganandan et al. (1995) and 
Raymond et al. (2009). Smedra-Kazmirska et al. (2013) found pellets < 1 cm length fired at 13 
J at 1 m distance from the cadaver can cause lung and heart membrane, liver, spleen, kidney, 
femoral artery and aorta injuries. They found the minimum initial KE from an airgun pellet that 
can result in lung or liver injury is 1.7 J when fired from 1 m. The KE required to cause bruising 
onto the lower leg was found to by 6.5 J from a 6 cm impactor by Desmoulin and Anderson 
(2011), with an energy density of 3.8 J/cm2. Skin penetration or laceration thresholds have also 
been investigated. At 23.99 J/cm2 the probability of skin penetration on the torso is 50%, with 
the required energy density increasing to 33.3 J/cm2 in areas without underlying bone (Bir et 
al. 2012). Di Maio et al. (1982) found a lower energy density threshold of 12.8 - 18.9 J/cm2 
when testing with lead air gun pellets, depending on the size of the pellet used. Koene and Papy 
(2011) report skin penetration can occur at > 10 J/cm2. This is also supported by Warlow et al. 
(2005) who found penetration occurred at 9.7 J/cm2. Lacerations occurred in 67% of the tests 
performed by Whittle et al. (2008) at 9.02 J. Eye injuries occur at much lower thresholds than 
other parts of the body. There is a 50% probability of corneal abrasion occurring at 0.184 J, 
retinal damage at 1.09 J, and globe rupture at 4 J (Duma 2005). In energy density thresholds, 
Sellier and Kneubuehl (1994) report 6J/cm2 needed for cornea perforation, and Koene and Papy 
(2011) report irreversible eye damage occurring at 2.5 J/cm2. These reports present a wide range 




The hazard footprint from an individual ballistic and the hazard intensity within it can be 
influenced by a variety of factors. These include crater size, ballistic size, ballistic kinetic 
energy, impact angle, slope, ballistic density, substrate hardness, ejecta travel distance and 
ejecta velocity. We now focus on ballistic kinetic energy, ballistic density, substrate hardness, 
ejecta travel distance and ejecta velocity which are suitable to investigate using the University 
of Canterbury’s pneumatic cannon. 
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4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Cannon experiments 
A pneumatic cannon was used to conduct impact ejecta experiments (Figure 4.3). Compressed 
air is used to build pressure in the barrel and release the trigger, allowing the piston to push the 
attached rock toward the ground. Only vertical tests could be completed due to the cannon being 
fixed to shipping containers in a vertical position. A container filled with different substrates 
was placed directly beneath the cannon. Each test was recorded by a Sony DSLR camera at 
1000 fps oriented perpendicular to the container, and three GoPro Hero 3+ and 4 cameras 
looking down onto the filled container, and across areas where ejecta would travel.  
 
In total 48 tests were completed, 24 onto a 1600 x 700 mm circular container filled with crusher 
dust (silt to pebble pieces of greywacke) to simulate ash and lapilli substrate, and 24 onto a 
1400 x 500 mm container filled with large basalt boulders to simulate lava flows and ballistics 
(Figure 4.3B). To keep substrate strength as constant as possible, the crusher dust was dug up 
after each test, recompacted and its strength measured twice using a Dynamic Cone 
Penetrometer (DCP).  
 
The ballistics used in these tests (Figure 4.3E, F and G) were dense basalt (~2.8 g/cm3), 
vesicular basalt (~2.13 g/cm3) and scoria (~1.43 g/cm3). All ballistics used measured between 
15 and 19 cm on their longest axis and each was weighed prior to testing. The dense and 
vesicular basalt ballistics were subrounded due to the coastal location we collected them from. 
The scoria was subangular to subrounded. To test the ballistic lithology, three tests of each 
lithology at 4 bar were conducted onto both substrates. 
 
In addition to substrate and lithology/density, velocity of the block was also varied, controlled 
by the pre-firing pressure reached in the barrel. Three tests at each pressure (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 
bar) were completed using the dense basalt blocks onto each substrate (18 tests for each).  
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Figure 4.3 Pneumatic cannon setup. Anticlockwise from top left: A) Barrel and piston with ballistic 
attached, B) Substrate container holding basalt boulders, C) Profile view of cannon containers with top 
container holding the barrel and piston and the bottom container holding the substrate container and 
deposition area, D) Area between cannon containers and control container with window for high-speed 
camera, laid with a tarpaulin to identify ejecta deposition, E) Scoria used as a ballistic, F) Vesicular basalt 
used as a ballistic, drilled partially to attach to piston, F) Dense basalt used as a ballistic, drilled partially to 
attach to piston 
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The maximum travel distance of the ejecta was recorded immediately after each test. Travel 
distance was, however, limited by the shipping container walls providing us with only a 
minimum travel distance for most tests. Additionally recorded was the size of the ejecta that 
travelled the maximum distance, the largest fragment ejected from the impact and its distance 
from impact, whether ejecta was from the substrate or the ballistic (ballistics were painted a 
bright colour in each of the basalt substrate tests), and the state of the ballistic post impact (e.g. 
whether it was intact, had shattered, left the substrate container).  
4.3.2. Video analysis 
High-speed videos were converted into stills of each frame using FFmpeg and imported into 
ImageJ. Some videos were too dark, and, in these instances, stills were imported into FastStone 
and the gamma changed to brighten the images and then imported into ImageJ. MtrackJ, an 
ImageJ plugin, was used to calculate velocity of the ejecta in each test. Five of the fastest 
moving particles (~1 cm in length) were tracked in each test along with one large fragment if 
present (from either the ballistic or the basalt substrate). Only those travelling perpendicular to 
the camera (i.e. left or right) were tracked to minimise error in velocity estimates due to the 
effects of tracking in 2D (Figure 4.4). Once velocity was calculated, kinetic energy was 
calculated for both the ballistic and the ejecta.  
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Figure 4.4 Five fastest ejecta tracked using MTrackJ. Each piece of ejecta has a different coloured track 
 
4.3.3. Ballistic trajectory modelling 
As the high-speed video could not capture the full ejecta trajectories, a ballistic trajectory model 
was used to produce the missing parts of the trajectories. Eject! (Mastin 2001) was used for 
ease of use as particles could be modelled individually. Table 4.2 lists the input parameters 
required and the range of values that were used in our modelling. Eject! has the option of 
modelling particles as a cube, sphere or artillery shell. As most of the ejecta were more 
rectangular in shape, the volume of the measured ejecta was calculated, and the cube root of 
this value used as the diameter and modelled as a cube. Thus, the diameter range provided in 
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Table 4.2 Eject! input parameters and values used in the modelling for this study 
 
Parameter Value Justification 
Drag coefficient 0.1 – 10.0, 
variable 
Set to variable unless trend did not match, then 
adjusted so that the output matched the experimental 
results 
Shape Cube low Ejecta were typically angular 
Density 1430, 2800 and 
2890 kg/m3 
Depended on whether modelling crusher dust, rock 
substrate or ballistic   
Diameter 0.00464 – 0.088 m  0.00464m for small ejecta (cube root of 1 x 0.5 x 
0.2cm) and > 0.00464 m for larger ejecta measured 
on the video 
Tailwind 0 m/s Tests performed inside containers 
Initial ejection velocity 4 – 210 m/s Depending on track modelled and MTrackJ velocity 
results 
Reduced drag 0 m No gas jet is present upon impact in contrast to an 
expanding column in an eruption 
Ejection angle 1 – 88° Based on angles found using MTrackJ and specific 
to each track 
Distance of landing 
below take-off point 
0 m Experiments on flat ground 
Elevation 20 m Elevation of cannon setup 
Temperature 25°C Average temperature while conducting tests 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Experiments 
Ballistics were fired between 12 and 70 m/s, impacting with kinetic energies between 275 and 
12618 J. Based on the fatality threshold stated in Baxter and Gresham (1997), all ballistics had 
impact energies capable of causing fatality. 
 
Substrate played a large part in whether the ballistic shattered on impact. Of the 24 tests onto 
crusher dust, none of the dense basalt ballistics broke on impact. In contrast 1 out of 3 and 2 
out of 3 of vesicular basalt and scoria ballistics respectively broke on impact (Table 4.3). 
Shattering increased when the substrate was dense basalt blocks. Of the 23 tests 10 out of 17 
dense basalt ballistics broke and 100% of the vesicular basalt and scoria ballistics fragmented 
(Table 4.3). The kinetic energy threshold for dense basalt to break on impact with the crusher 
dust was therefore > 12800 J, and < 5900 J for vesicular basalt and scoria. The energy threshold 
for breakage for all ballistic densities onto the dense basalt substrate was < 2800 J.  
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Table 4.3 Number of ballistics that broke on impact split into substrate, lithology and kinetic energy 
 
    Crusher Dust     Basalt rock   
KE Dense basalt Vesicular basalt Scoria Dense basalt Vesicular basalt Scoria 
<1000 0/2     3/5     
1000-2000 0/1   1/1       
2000-3000 0/2   1/2 1/1 1/1 3/3 
3000-4000 0/4     0/2 1/1   
4000-5000 0/1 0/1   0/1 1/1   
5000-6000 0/1  1/2   1/1     
6000-7000 0/4           
7000-8000 0/1     3/4     
8000+ 0/2     2/3     
Total 0/18  1/3 2/3 10/17 3/3 3/3 
 
Small ejecta (~1 cm length) velocity ranged from 2 to 138 m/s. Larger shrapnel from the 
ballistics or ejecta from the basalt substrate (2 to 19.5 cm length) was generally slower and 
ranged from 2 to 30 m/s. Plotting the small ejecta kinetic energy against the ballistics kinetic 
energy of all the dense basalt tests onto rock shows that ejecta kinetic energy increases with the 
ballistics kinetic energy (Figure 4.5A). Comparing the dense basalt tests onto crusher dust with 
impacts onto dense basalt blocks, it is evident that impacts onto harder or more consolidated 
substrates produce ejecta with higher kinetic energies. A dense basalt ballistic impacting at 
12618 J onto crusher dust produced 1 cm ejecta with 0.02 J of kinetic energy. A dense basalt 
ballistic with similar kinetic energy (12096 J) that impacted a basalt target produced 1 cm ejecta 
with 0.59 J – an order of magnitude more kinetic energy than the crusher dust test (Figure 4.5B).  
 
Ballistic density also influenced the ejecta kinetic energy. Denser ballistics produced ejecta 
with higher kinetic energies than low density ballistics when fired at basalt targets. Figure 4.5C 
shows 1 cm ejecta from dense basalt ballistics with kinetic energies between 0.1 and 0.33 J 
compared with 0.04 J from vesicular basalt ballistics and 0.02 – 0.04 J from scoria ballistics. 
Additionally, the ejecta produced in the scoria and vesicular basalt tests is almost entirely 
shrapnel from the ballistics rather than any debris from the substrate (basalt). This differs from 
the dense basalt onto basalt block substrate tests where ejecta was a mix of both shrapnel and 
substrate debris. 
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Figure 4.5 Ejecta kinetic energy (KE) plotted against the ballistic kinetic energy. A) Average small ejecta 
KE from each test from dense basalt ballistics impacting basalt rock surface, B) Average small ejecta KE 
from each test from dense basalt ballistics impacting crusher dust and basalt rock, C) Average small ejecta 
KE from each test of dense basalt, scoria and vesicular basalt ballistics fired at the same pressure impacting 
basalt rock 
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In 41 out of 44 of the tests, ejecta reached 2.95 m – to the confining walls of the cannon 
structure. As we could not measure the full distance that the ejecta reached, we used the 
trajectory model Eject! (Mastin 2001) to model how the kinetic energy would change over the 
full trajectory. 
4.4.2. Experiments vs model 
The kinetic energy of ejecta generally decreases with distance from impact which means that 
ejecta may not be hazardous over the entire trajectory or may decrease the resulting injury 
severity. High speed video of the impact tests allowed us to analyse the ejecta kinetic energy 
changes over the first 1.4 m from the impact site. However, over this short distance we noted a 
considerable variation in velocity (0.2 – 4 m/s) along each track. In Figure 4.6 ejecta kinetic 
energy is plotted against distance for 12 tracked particles from the cannon tests (labelled video).  
 
To assess how kinetic energy changed with distances greater than 1.4 m, we used Eject! to 
model the full trajectories of ejecta. Firstly, we modelled our experimental ejecta tracks to 
validate Eject! against our results. To match our recorded tracks we adjusted the initial velocity 
(as due to the dust created on impact, tracks did not begin immediately at the impact site) and 
the drag coefficient (between 0.1 and 10 depending on the size and velocity of the ejecta) to get 
the best fit with the tracks. The other values were known from the video analysis or 
measurements taken at the site (Table 4.2). Modelling generally matched well to the video 
tracked ejecta as seen in Figure 4.6.  However, in most of the tests performed in this study, a 
wobble in ejecta kinetic energy with distance is observed. Taddeucci et al. (2017) have observed 
wobbles in ballistic projectile trajectories and velocities, attributing this to rotation and spinning 
(among other factors) of the projectile. They observed decreasing acceleration of irregular 
shaped ballistics when the ballistic’s frontal area (orthogonal to the trajectory) increases due to 
rotation and the subsequent changes to drag on the ballistic. Additionally, they observed 
centimetre to decimetre scale wobbling in some trajectories, especially those of irregular shaped 
ballistics. Video footage of the experiments reported here clearly show spinning and rotation, 
therefore it is likely that this is the mechanism causing the observed wobble in kinetic energy. 
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This phenomenon, however, is not observed in the modelled trajectories as Eject! ignores the 
effects of spinning and rotation (Mastin 2001). 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Tracked (shown as points) and modelled (presented as a line) ejecta kinetic energy plotted with 
distance from impact. A) large ejecta, B) small ejecta. Each colour represents one tracked ejecta. Error bars 
have been applied to the tracked ejecta for error in velocity from trajectories that may not be perpendicular 
to the camera (between 70 – 90°). 
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4.4.3. Modelled ejecta 
Modelling ejecta trajectories allowed us to analyse changes in kinetic energy at greater 
distances than what could be observed in the cannon experiment footage, and to assess the full 
extent of the ejecta footprint. Additionally, as we could not model every particle in each test 
(only the five fastest and the largest) because of time limitations, we modelled what was 
theoretically possible based on the tracked ejecta and observations recorded from each test. This 
allowed us to see the range of ejecta hazard footprints that could be produced from ballistics 
with similar characteristics (e.g. size, velocity, lithology) to those used in the tests. Size, 
velocity and ejection angle were varied one at a time to see the influence of each variable 
separately. Based on the range of ejecta sizes produced in our tests, we modelled ejecta 1 cm to 
19 cm in length (Figure 4.7A) at 9 m/s (the average speed of ejecta > 1 cm) and 45°. Initial 
kinetic energies ranged between 0.01 J and 78 J. Each trajectory was parabolic; kinetic energy 
declines with distance during the upward trajectory and then increases in kinetic energy again 
during the downward trajectory due to gravity. Ejecta travel distance ranged between 6.2 m and 
8.1 m. 
 
Velocity and ejection angle were modelled for two sizes (1 cm and 9 cm) as the smallest ejecta 
in our experiments were observed to travel much faster than the larger particles. Therefore, 
modelling at 1 cm and 9 cm better represents the commonly observed ejecta characteristics. 
Figure 4.7B and C show the results for a 1 cm ejecta. Velocities were modelled at 20 m/s 
increments up to 210 m/s – the fastest velocity measured in the cannon tests. Initial kinetic 
energies ranged between 0.01 J and 6.17 J and maximum travel distance between 7.2 and 52 m. 
Varying the ejection angle influenced the travel distance of the 1 cm ejecta (Figure 4.7C). A 1 
cm particle ejected at 210 m/s could travel between 3 m when ejected at 88° and 60 m at 50°.  
 
Figure 4.7D shows a 9 cm particle (the average size for large ejecta) ejected at 45° could have 
initial kinetic energies between 0.4 J and 92 J and a travel distance between 40 cm and 65 m 
when ejected at velocities between 2 and 30 m/s (the slowest and fastest velocities recorded for 
large ejecta). As with the 1 cm particle, when ejection angle of a 9 cm particle is varied, the 
maximum travel distance changes (Figure 4.7E). A 9 cm particle ejected at 9 m/s can travel 
between 0.6m when ejected at 88° and 7.8 m at 40°. 
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The hazard footprint for ejecta from ballistics impacting at 275 - 12618 J could therefore vary 
between 0.4 and 60 m radius, with ejecta kinetic energies between 0.01 and 92 J. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Modelled possibilities of ejecta trajectories and kinetic energies with distance from impact. 
Varying A) size keeping velocity set at 9 m/s and ejection angle at 45°, B) velocity of small ejecta (1 cm) with 
ejection angles of 45°, C) ejection angle of small ejecta (1 cm) at 210 m/s, D) velocity of average large ejecta 
(9 cm) at 45°, E) ejection angle of average large ejecta (9 cm) at 9 m/s 
 
 
Pneumatic cannon experiments were used to investigate impact ejecta travel distances and 
impact energies to better constrain the role ejecta plays in the ballistic hazard footprint. We 
found that blocks impacting into harder/more consolidated substrate were more likely to 
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fragment on impact than into less consolidated substrate, and harder/denser blocks were less 
likely to fragment than lower density blocks. Additionally, substrate, block density and velocity 
all affected the kinetic energy of ejecta. Ejecta kinetic energy was found to increase as the 
impacting block kinetic energy increased. Furthermore, the kinetic energy of ejecta from dense 
block impacts onto hard substrates was higher than those from more porous blocks and softer 
substrates. As the full trajectory of ejecta could not be captured by the high-speed camera, Eject! 
ballistic trajectory model was used to assess the full travel distance and analyse how kinetic 
energy changes over the entire trajectory. Using the cannon experiment data to inform 
modelling parameters, we found that ejecta could produce hazard footprint radii between 0.4 m 
and 60 m, and kinetic energies between 0.1 and 92 J. 
4.5. Discussion 
Results from the cannon experiments show that substrate and ballistic density influenced 
whether the ballistic broke on impact and the kinetic energy of the ejecta produced. This is 
likely due to the varying rock properties and how energy is partitioned in an impact. Dense 
basalt has a higher Young’s Modulus (11 - 73 GPa) than vesicular basalt (5 - 19 GPa), scoria 
(11.3 GPa) or sand (10 – 69 MPa), thus it needs greater stress before it will elastically deform 
(Shultz 1993; Kılıç et al. 2003; Zhu 2014; Schaefer et al. 2015). Additionally, dense basalt also 
has a higher uniaxial compressive strength (138 - 262 MPa) than scoria (0.24 - 28.3 MPa), 
vesicular basalt (38 - 106 MPa) or sand (<0.1 MPa) and needs greater stress applied to it before 
it will break (Schultz 1993; Kılıç et al. 2003; Schaefer et al. 2015; Juimo et al. 2017). 
 
Braslau (1970) and Gault and Heitowit (1963) analysed the partitioning of energy from 
hypervelocity impacts into loose sand and basalt targets respectively. They found that ~53% of 
the ballistic’s impact energy was transferred to the ejecta kinetic energy. For loose sand impacts, 
8% went into comminution, 20% into compaction and 32% into waste heat. In the basalt target 
tests 10 – 24% of the impact energy went into comminution, < 1% into compaction and 23 – 
35% into waste heat. Hartmann (1985) observed much lower partitioning of impact energy into 
ejecta kinetic energy, with around 0.1% for slow impacts (<1 km/s) to ~10% for fast impacts 
(up to 2.3 km/s). Other experiments of impacts into rock have found ejecta kinetic energy 
ranged from 10% of the initial impact energy (O’Keefe and Ahrens 1977) to 9 – 92% (Waza et 
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al. 1985). We do not have the data to analyse energy partitioning from our impact tests, 
however, we can compare our results and draw some conclusions.  
 
We propose that dense basalt ballistics did not break when impacting crusher dust as more of 
the impact energy was transferred into the surface to compact the sand and eject debris to 
produce a crater than into breaking the rock. The dense basalt rebounded elastically and did not 
experience enough stress to fail and cause breakage (the stress on impact was less than the 
compressive strength of the dense basalt). Whereas for the scoria and vesicular basalt, their 
lower compressive strengths were overcome by the impact stress, and they failed. The greatest 
ejecta kinetic energies were produced from dense basalt impacts onto basalt rock. There was 
no loss in energy into compaction and crater production, instead most of the energy was 
partitioned into fragmentation and kinetic energy of the ejecta. The higher Young’s Modulus 
of the dense basalt allowed for efficient elastic rebound and more of kinetic energy transferred 
into the ejecta. Because the scoria and vesicular basalt was weaker and had a lower Young’s 
Modulus, more energy was lost during fragmentation which produced more ejecta but with less 
kinetic energy. 
4.6. Application of results to ballistic hazard footprint 
The experimental and modelling data presented in this paper can be used to better constrain the 
size of the individual ballistic hazard footprint and better understand the hazard intensity from 
ejecta and how this changes over the footprint. In addition, the injury data described in Section 
4.2.2 can be used to create damage states, hazard intensity thresholds and fragility functions to 
understand potential injury severity from being within a ballistic hazard footprint. We apply the 
damage states, hazard intensity thresholds and fragility functions to two cannon experiments to 
show how these results could be used in future risk assessments. 
4.6.1. Vulnerability model 
A range of outcomes can occur from being impacted or being in the impact area of a ballistic, 
from no injury to death. These outcomes can be classified, categorised and assessed for their 
damage severity using an impact scale (Blong 2003; Wilson et al. 2014, 2017). The ideal scale 
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to use in this instance would be the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS). It is a numerical scale and 
is now widely used as a traumatic injury scoring system (Loftis et al. 2018). However, it does 
not link the damage severity to the hazard intensity (impact energy). Whether ballistics cause 
death or injury and the severity of that injury largely depends on their impact energy and where 
on the body they impact. We use impact energy as the measure of hazard intensity (Hazard 
Intensity Metric). As we do not have sufficient hazard intensity data to apply to every level of 
the AIS, we have created our own damage states (Table 4.4). Levels include 0 (no injury), 1 
(minor injury), 2 (serious injury) and 3 (death). Minor injuries were considered non-life 
threatening and included lacerations, bruising and eye injuries. Serious injuries were those that 
could be life threatening, potentially causing internal bleeding and brain injury. 
 
Table 4.4 Numerical damage state scale with associated damage descriptions 
 
Damage State Damage description 
0 No injury 
1 Minor injury 
2 Serious injury 
3 Death 
 
The damage states were then applied to the damage data presented in Section 4.2.2, in Table 
4.5.  
 
Table 4.5 Ballistic damage descriptions and hazard intensity metrics from the medical literature with 
damage states applied 
 
Study Kinetic Energy (J) Injury DS Reference 
1 80 Death 3 Baxter and Gresham 1997 
2 76 Skull fracture with 10% chance of fatality 2 Radi 2013 
3 28 Skull fracture  2 Yoganandan et al. 1995 
4 13 Lung membrane injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 13 Heart membrane injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 13 Liver injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 13 Spleen injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 13 Kidney injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 13 Femoral artery injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 13 Aorta injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 1.7 Lung injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
4 1.7 Liver injury 2 Smedra-Kazmirska et al. 2013 
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5 6.5 Bruising to lower leg 1 Desmoulin and Anderson 2011 
6 23.99 50% probability of skin penetration of the torso 1 Bir et al. 2012 
7 12.8 Skin penetration 1 Di Maio et al. 1982 
8 10 Skin penetration 1 Koene and Papy 2011 
9 9.7 Skin penetration 1 Warlow et al. 2005 
10 9.02 Laceration 1 Whittle et al. 2008 
11 0.184 Corneal abrasion 1 Duma 2005 
11 1.09 Retinal damage 1 Duma 2005 
11 4 Eye globe rupture 1 Duma 2005 
12 6 Corneal perforation 1 Sellier and Kneubuehl 1994 
8 2.5 Irreversible eye damage 1 Koene and Papy 2011 
13 27.4 Skull fracture 2 Raymond et al. 2009 
13 19.6 Skull fracture 2 Raymond et al. 2009 
13 51.5 Skull fracture 2 Raymond et al. 2009 
13 54.1 Skull fracture 2 Raymond et al. 2009 
13 58.5 Skull fracture 2 Raymond et al. 2009 
13 63.4 Skull fracture 2 Raymond et al. 2009 
13 63.8 Skull fracture 2 Raymond et al. 2009 
 
To relate hazard intensity (kinetic energy) to damage severity (damage state) fragility functions 
derived from our collated damage data (Table 4.5) were created. Fragility functions express the 
probability that a damage state will be reached or exceeded as a function of hazard intensity 
(Wilson et al. 2017). Following the methodology set out in Porter (2007) and Wilson et al. 
(2017), all damage data was ordered by increasing impact energy and binned, with each bin 
having approximately the same number of data points (Figure 4.8). The probability of reaching 
or exceeding each damage state was then calculated for each HIM bin by adding the number of 
data points that were equal or greater than the specific damage state and dividing that by the 
total number of data points in that bin. The probability for that damage state can then be plotted 
against the median impact energy of each bin (Figure 4.8). To assign a HIM for each damage 
state we use 50% probability, therefore DS1 will occur at or above 1.6 J, DS2 at or above 8.2 
J, and DS3 at or above 66.8 J. 
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Figure 4.8 Ejecta damage histogram and fragility functions. A) Bar graph of literature derived damage data 
classified by damage state into three ejecta impact energy bins. B) Fragility functions derived from damage 
literature showing probability of reaching or exceeding each damage state vs ejecta impact energy 
 
 
4.6.2. Hazard model 
Damage states and hazard intensity metrics allow us to understand and explore the range of 
consequences to humans from ballistic impact and the hazard intensity at which these are likely 
to occur. As demonstrated in the preceding sections, the hazard intensity can vary across the 
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hazard footprint as impact energy usually decreases with distance from impact. Subsequently, 
the likely impact severity will also vary across the footprint and thus ballistics should not be 
considered binary hazards. To assess likely impact severity across the hazard footprint, we can 
apply our damage states and HIMs to the hazard footprint and zone the footprint depending on 
what DS is expected. This allows us to estimate areas and distances at which to expect certain 
consequences. We apply the damages states and HIMs produced in Section 4.6.1 to our cannon 
results to provide an example of this methodology. 
 
As observed in Figure 4.7, the ejecta hazard footprint can change with changing velocity, size 
and ejection angle of the ejecta. Thus, two scenarios were chosen from the cannon results to 
illustrate how the vulnerability model can be applied to the hazard footprint to assess the 
changing hazard intensity: 1) A cannon test fired at 2 bar onto crusher dust using a dense basalt 
ballistic; and 2) a 5-bar test fired at basalt rock using a dense basalt ballistic. The tracked ejecta 
from the relevant test were modelled in Eject! to ascertain the full trajectories of the ejecta. The 
hazard footprint radius is based on the maximum travel distance as ejecta cannot travel further 
than this. Therefore, the hazard footprint for scenario 1 has a radius of 8 m and is 201 m2 (Figure 
4.9A), and scenario 2 has a radius of 29 m and an area of 2642 m2 (Figure 4.9B). 
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Figure 4.9 Hazard footprints from two tests based on modelled maximum ejecta travel distance. A) 2 bar 
test onto crusher dust using a dense basalt ballistic, and B) a 5-bar test fired at basalt rock using a dense 
basalt ballistic. Each colour represents a piece of ejecta 
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All ejecta from scenario 1 fall within DS0 as none have kinetic energies ≥ 1.6 J. However, we 
do know the kinetic energy of the ballistic (2403 J) which is above the DS3 threshold therefore 
the first 9 cm is classified as DS3 (Figure 4.10A).  
 
Scenario 2 can be divided up into three damage states. As with scenario 1, the ballistic impacts 
above the threshold of DS 3 at 8784 J, thus the first 8 cm are zoned DS3. Four ejecta were 
tracked and range in their kinetic energies and travel distances. Taking a 
precautionary/conservative approach as it is a potential life safety issue, we use the highest 
kinetic energy and greatest travel distance to set damage zones.  Figure 4.10B shows that the 
highest ejecta KE is above the DS2 threshold until 10 m at which point it drops below this 
threshold to DS1 until it lands at 11 m. The highest kinetic energy from here is well below the 
DS1 threshold with ejecta landing until 29 m distance from the ballistic impact. Thus, we have 
zoned DS2 until 10 m, DS1 until 11 m and DS0 until 29 m where the hazard footprint ends. 
However, the kinetic energies of the tracks could also be averaged, and the average trajectory 
used to set damage zones. 
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Figure 4.10 Hazard footprints zoned by damage state based on maximum kinetic energy and modelled 
maximum ejecta travel distance from two tests. A) 2 bar test onto crusher dust using a dense basalt ballistic, 
and B) a 5-bar test fired at basalt rock using a dense basalt ballistic. Each colour represents a piece of ejecta 
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4.7. Conclusions 
Many injuries and fatalities have been recorded from volcanic ballistic projectiles. However, it 
was unclear which aspects of the ballistic hazard could cause these outcomes. The hazard 
footprint around an individual ballistic impact can be influenced by a number of factors 
including crater size, ballistic size, ejecta apron size, impact angle, slope, substrate and ballistic 
lithology. Using a pneumatic cannon, we investigated how the kinetic energy of the ballistic, 
the substrate impacted, and the density of the ballistic influenced whether ejecta was produced, 
if that ejecta was capable of causing injury or death, and over what distance. Results indicated 
that ballistics should not be considered as a binary hazard and that direct impact and impact 
ejecta can cause a range of injuries or death.  Additionally, density, substrate and velocity all 
affected the kinetic energy of ejecta. Ejecta produced from dense ballistic impacts onto hard 
substrates had higher kinetic energies than ejecta from more porous ballistics and softer 
substrates. Experiments combined with trajectory modelling allowed for analysis of kinetic 
energy changes along the ejecta trajectory so that hazard intensity could be analysed over the 
whole ejecta hazard footprint. Four damage states were created to classify damage/injury 
severity and fragility functions were derived from this data to assign hazard intensity metrics 
to the damage states. Using the hazard intensity metrics and damage states we assessed the 
hazard footprint and probability of injury from ejecta from two of the cannon tests. Injury 
severity ranged from DS2 (serious) to DS0 (no injury) over the 207.65 m2 and 2569.7 m2 hazard 
footprints.  
 
The damage states, hazard intensity metrics and fragility functions developed here should be 
built on by others to include a widened set of variables (velocity, surfaces etc.) and could be 
useful tools to apply in volcanic hazard and risk assessments. 
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Chapter Five – Conclusions 
An increasing number of visitors to, and people living near, volcanoes creates increased 
exposure to volcanic hazards (Erfurt-Cooper, Sigurdsson and Lopes 2015). The recent disaster 
at Mt Ontake, Japan and the 367 deaths from ballistic impact at volcanoes around the world 
shows how dangerous volcanic ballistics can be (Tsunematsu et al. 2016; Brown et al. 2017). 
This necessitates better understanding of the hazard and its consequences so that more effective 
disaster risk reduction strategies can be practiced. These strategies should be based on 
appropriate and targeted scientific data and use a risk-based approach. 
 
In comparison to other volcanic hazards (e.g. ashfall) volcanic ballistics have received little 
research attention despite being the most common cause of fatalities for visitors and scientists 
on volcanoes (Brown et al. 2017). There is a plethora of data recording how far ballistics can 
travel (Minakami 1942; Nairn and Self 1978; Blong 1984; Kilgour et al. 2010; Alatorre-
Ibargüengoitia et al. 2012) but little data on how they are distributed and their spatial density 
within this area. This can be attributed to the inherent risk to scientists mapping time-sensitive 
ballistic deposits where there may be further eruptions. As such, when ballistics have been 
included in hazard and risk assessments and management decisions, ballistic hazard has 
traditionally been considered by placing a precautionary zone around the volcano, often based 
on the maximum travel distance of ballistics (e.g. Coombs et al. 2008; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia 
et al. 2012). This management approach is relatively crude and potentially unsuitable to many 
risk contexts, particularly with increasing tourist activity and other livelihood pressures 
necessitating access to active volcanoes.  Additionally, little work has been done to determine 
the hazard footprint of an individual ballistic. When assessing risk in the past, only a direct hit 
by a ballistic has been considered (Jolly et al. 2014; Deligne et al. 2018). However, there are 
many other aspects of a ballistic impact that make up the hazard footprint. The hazard footprint 
area is used by risk managers to calculate the probability of someone being hit by a ballistic 
while on the volcano (Jolly et al. 2014; Deligne et al. 2018). It is essential to know the potential 
size of the hazard footprint that a person could be affected by and the hazard intensity that may 
be experienced.  
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Within this context, this thesis has sought to better understand: ballistic hazard and risk and 
how it is assessed,  managed and communicated,  providing an overview of the topic area, 
knowledge gaps to guide the more in-depth hazard research that follows and recommendations 
for future management and communication  (Objective 1); how ballistics are distributed within 
a ballistic field and their spatial hazard intensity (Objective 2); the temporal deposition of 
ballistics and how this is influenced by eruption dynamics (Objective 3); the factors that 
contribute to the hazard footprint from an individual ballistic (Objective 4); and the hazard 
intensity from impact ejecta within the individual hazard footprint (Objective 5).  Improving 
our understanding of ballistic hazard in the aforementioned ways will improve our ability to 
assess hazard and risk and subsequently apply appropriate disaster risk reduction measures.   
 
5.1. Key findings from each thesis chapter 
Understanding how ballistic hazard and risk is communicated and managed, how ballistics are 
distributed in space and time, and how hazard intensity changes over the hazard footprint vastly 
improve our ability to assess ballistic hazard and risk. This section summarises the major 
findings of each chapter, supported by a summary table (Table 5.1) detailing the key findings 
for each objective. 
5.1.1. Chapter 2 
Ballistic hazard and risk changes depending on the eruptive state of the volcano, exposure of 
assets and people, and their vulnerability, and ballistic risk management and communication 
strategies applied at volcanoes should also reflect this. A literature review of ballistic hazard 
characteristics and current knowledge, consequences to society, and management and 
communication methods used for both ballistic hazard and other volcanic hazards resulted in 
recommendations for how to improve ballistic hazard communication and management.  To 
manage and communicate ballistic risk effectively, recommended methods and actions to take 
include: 1) Hazard and risk assessments specific to the volcano, which, if appropriate, include 
ballistics. These assessments should be accessible by emergency managers and decision makers 
with authors/scientists available to answer questions and advise where necessary and practical; 
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2) The inclusion of ballistic hazard zones in hazard maps with accompanying advice on actions 
to take. Maps should be updated in a crisis with new information and readily available through 
a range of media. These maps should continue to be updated after an eruption when detailed 
scientific studies are complete; 3) Volcano monitoring systems to monitor volcanic activity and 
indicate volcano unrest; 4) Signage around the volcano to communicate ballistic hazard and 
risk to visitors, in addition to other hazard advice such as warning systems where practical, with 
a focus on effectiveness of communication; 5) Volcanic alert bulletins, media releases or reports 
to communicate ballistic hazard and risk in crisis phases; and 6) Open, sufficiently frequent 
communication between scientists, stakeholders, emergency managers and local communities.  
5.1.2. Chapter 3 
Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu was used as a case study to assess how ballistic distribution and 
intensity change over a ballistic field.  It was found that ballistic hazard can vary over relatively 
small areas. The ballistic spatial density and mean ballistic diameter decreased with distance 
from the crater. Analysis of the spatial density across the field revealed higher densities in the 
S – SSE compared to the rest of the field. Video, geophysical data and topographic analysis 
show that this was due to preferential directionality in explosions. However, directionality was 
found to vary over time when two data sets over different timescales were compared. To get 
the highest resolution understanding of the spatial and temporal aspects of the hazard and make 
the most effective risk management decisions, assessments should be conducted over as much 
of the volcano as possible and address a timeframe relevant to the longevity of the hazard 
assessment, i.e. includes all temporal hazard changes that may occur in the relevant timeframe. 
It is also important to map ballistics as quickly as possible to get an accurate assessment of the 
hazard because Yasur ballistics were buried by further eruption deposits over time. Without this 
consideration, the ballistic hazard could be underestimated or distorted. 
5.1.3. Chapter 4 
The size of the hazard footprint from an individual impact and the intensity (kinetic energy) are 
also important considerations when assessing hazard and risk to humans. The hazard footprint 
is the area around a ballistic impact in which a person is in potential danger and is used by risk 
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managers to calculate probability of casualty from a ballistic impact, while the kinetic 
energy/hazard intensity is used to calculate vulnerability. The size of the footprint depends on 
the impact energy of the ballistic, ballistic diameter, crater diameter, ejecta travel distance, 
ejecta impact energy, ballistic density, substrate hardness, impact angle and slope. Pneumatic 
cannon experiments showed that ejecta from ballistic impacts was an important part of the 
hazard footprint. Some ejecta produced on impact had sufficient kinetic energy to cause fatality 
or injury, though this was highly dependent on the hardness of the substrate impacted, the 
density of the ballistic, the impact energy, and the distance along the ejecta trajectory. Ejecta 
typically did not retain kinetic energy levels over the entire trajectory, indicating that hazard 
intensity changed over the hazard footprint. Kinetic energy is therefore a suitable hazard 
intensity metric for individual ballistic hazard footprints.  
 
Table 5.1 Key findings and thesis objectives from each chapter 
 
Chapter Thesis objective Key findings 
Chapter 2: The 
communication and risk 
management of volcanic 
ballistic hazards 
6) Review ballistic hazard and 
risk characteristics, 
management and 
communication to provide 
an overview of the topic and 
provide recommendations 
for how management and 
communication could be 
improved. 
 
Recommended strategies to manage and 
communicate ballistic risk effectively:  
1A) Accessible hazard and risk 
assessments specific to the volcano, 
which, if appropriate, include 
ballistics 
1B) The inclusion of ballistic hazard 
zones in hazard maps with 
accompanying advice on actions to 
take. Maps should be updated with 
changing levels of crisis with new 
information and readily available 
through a range of media  
1C) Targeted volcano monitoring systems 
to monitor volcanic activity and 
indicate volcano unrest 
1D) Signage and warning systems around 
the volcano to communicate ballistic 
hazard and risk to visitors 
1E) Volcanic alert bulletins, media 
releases or reports to communicate 
ballistic hazard and risk in crisis 
phases  
1F) Open, sufficiently frequent 
communication between scientists, 
stakeholders, emergency managers 
and local communities. 
Chapter 3: Ballistic 
deposition from a frequently 
7) Determine the size and 
spatial distribution of 
ballistics from a complex, 
2A) The spatial density of the ballistics 
decreased with increasing distance 
away from the crater 
 
Chapter Five – Conclusions 
 
Page | 148  
 
erupting volcano: Yasur 
Volcano, Vanuatu 
 
cumulative ballistic field 
through detailed mapping, 
to understand the spatial and 
temporal distribution of 
hazard intensity across the 
hazard footprint. 
 
8) Using an integrative 
approach, assess temporal 
ballistic hazard and how this 
is affected by eruption 
dynamics. 
 
2B) The mean ballistic diameter 
decreased with distance from the 
crater. 
2C) Higher spatial densities of ballistics 
are seen in the S-SSE than in other 
directions due to explosion 
directionality.  
3A) A different directionality was 
observed in the GoPro videos than 
in the daily observations and 
ballistics mapped from aerial 
photos, representing the short-term 
and long-term directionality trends 
respectively. 
3B) Field preservation issues are 
observed, with the burial of 
ballistics by further deposition of 
tephra over time. Therefore, ballistic 
mapping is time sensitive after an 
eruption and delays in mapping will 
likely be accompanied by decrease 
in field preservation and result in an 
underestimation of ballistic hazard. 
 
Chapter 4: Using pneumatic 
cannon experiments to 
understand ejecta hazard 
intensity within ballistic 
hazard footprints 
9) Review and understand the 
factors that contribute to the 
hazard footprint from an 
individual ballistic impact  
 
10) Quantify the size and hazard 
intensity from impact ejecta 
associated with ballistics of 
different density and 
different substrates to the 
individual hazard footprint 
to improve ballistic hazard 
and risk assessments 
 
4A) Contributing factors to ballistic 
hazard footprint size include: 
ballistic kinetic energy, ballistic 
size, crater size, ejecta apron size, 
slope, impact angle, ballistic 
density, and substrate hardness 
5A) Ballistic density, substrate and 
velocity affect the kinetic energy of 
ejecta. 
5B) Ejecta produced from dense ballistic 
impacts onto hard substrates had 
higher kinetic energies than ejecta 
from more porous ballistics and 
softer substrates 
5C) Kinetic energy is an appropriate 
hazard intensity metric for ballistic 
impact and, combined with the 
damage states and fragility 
functions, can be used to assess 
exposure and vulnerability in the 
future. 
 
5.2. Future work 
This research has identified a number of avenues for future work.  Wider ballistic research 
should look to focus on: 
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1) Using an integrated approach to monitor and forecast ballistic hazard. Chapter 3 
highlighted how acoustic data is highly complementary to visual observation of eruption 
size/energy. There may be potential to use geophysical networks to monitor and forecast 
the expected area of ballistic deposition. A larger eruption ejects ballistics further, 
therefore greater magnitude acoustic waves could indicate greater ballistic hazard. 
However, these data remain relatively un-calibrated. Appendix A describes the 
effectiveness of acoustic monitoring in recording eruptive activity at Yasur. 
2) Improving understanding of human exposure to ballistic hazard. The number of people 
that visit a volcano may be known, but little is understood about human behaviour in 
terms of movement on a volcano during non-eruption and rapid onset eruption situations 
(including evacuation dynamics).  
3) Improving understanding of vulnerability within ballistic risk assessments. Human 
vulnerability research is scant for ballistic impacts. All that is known is the types and 
severity of injuries that can be sustained from direct ballistic impact (Baxter and 
Gresham 1997; Shiroko 2016). Research is needed to determine which areas of the body 
are most exposed and the likelihood of injury occurring with varying hazard intensity 
(i.e. fragility functions) for different parts of the body. This research should be 
conducted by someone with a medical background who understands injury severity. In 
addition to human vulnerability, further research is also needed on building and 
infrastructure vulnerability to ballistic impact. Some work has been done to assess 
building vulnerability (see Appendix D and references therein), however further 
building typologies and other infrastructure should also be analysed, and fragility 
functions created.  
4) Systematic and robust collection of damage data for both people and the built 
environment to inform exposure and vulnerability calculations and fragility functions. 
Chapter 4 reviews the limited literature available for human impacts, however further 
research into other similar causes of injury, further experiments, and better recording of 
ballistic impacts that occur on volcanoes (including the nature of the injury, the 
location/distance from vent that the injury occurred at, and any information on the size 
and characteristics of the ballistic) is needed. Additionally, Appendix D provides some 
damage data for buildings, though there is a lack of data for other infrastructure. 
Similarly to human impacts, useful data to collect for building and infrastructure 
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includes descriptions of the damage observed, descriptions of the asset affected i.e. 
building type and element damaged, location or distance from the vent, and ballistic size 
and characteristics. 
5) Including ballistics in volcanic multi-hazard assessments where appropriate. Often 
ballistics are left out as the hazard footprint of other hazards (PDCs and ash) are larger 
and engulf the ballistic footprint. However, ballistics are often the most damaging and 
dangerous hazard produced in unheralded and small (e.g. phreatic, Strombolian) 
eruptions, as seen at Mt Ontake (Kaneko et al. 2016; Tsunematsu et al. 2016) and Upper 
Te Maari (Fitzgerald et al. 2014). Appendix C describes eruptions scenarios, that 
include ballistic modelling, created to assess consequences and risk from eruptions in 
the Auckland Volcanic Field. Effective Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) should to be 
underpinned by effective understanding of the potential hazard and risks (UNISDR 
2015). 
6) Improving ballistic risk management and communication to reduce consequences. This 
should take into account volcanoes that are highly visited and/or settled, unheralded 
eruptions, volcanoes with poorly understood eruptive histories, volcanoes with limited 
monitoring resources, and engagement between authorities and stakeholders. 
 
More specific suggestions of future work directions for ballistic hazard include: 
- Increasing the breadth of data available on ballistic distribution within a field, especially 
from varying eruptions styles and sizes (see Appendix B for preliminary mapping from 
a multi-vent phreatic and phreatomagmatic eruption). More quality size, distribution 
and spatial density data available on a wide variety of ballistic fields will result in a 
more accurate and detailed understanding of the hazard and how this varies between 
different volcanoes and eruption styles. 
- Expanding ejecta hazard footprint size and intensity testing to refine the footprint and 
hazard intensity metrics. In this thesis, only three lithologies, two surfaces and velocities 
between 12 and 70 m/s were tested. Further testing could include other surfaces such as 
scoria and concrete/asphalt that represents carparks and paths around volcanoes; more 
lithologies such as more crystalline ballistics (andesitic or dacitic lavas) and obsidian 
(as seen at Puyahue-Cordon Caulle following the 2011 eruption); and an extended 
velocity range. 
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- More research to understand and quantify the other factors described in Chapter 4 that 
influence hazard footprint size. This may be experimental or from fieldwork. 
- A model that can incorporate all factors of hazard footprint to produce expected 
footprint size and hazard intensity over different areas/changing volcanic landscapes. 
This could then be quickly used by risk managers to calculate vulnerability and risk. 
- Mapping over longer time scales and at varying periodicities both at Yasur and at other 
volcanoes. The ballistic mapping at Yasur only encompasses three months of explosions 
and within that time eruption directionality changed. Better understanding of the short 
term and long-term spatial hazard is needed. 
This will lead to a much better understanding of ballistic hazard from any eruption, more 
accurate risk assessments, and more targeted risk management strategies. 
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